The Demand for Ethanol as a Gasoline Substitute by Soren T. Anderson
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Matias Busso, Brian Cadena, Lucas Davis, Alex Farrell,
Meredith Fowlie, Ben Keys, Brian Kovak, Erin Mansur, Michael Moore, Alex Resch, Stephen Salant,
Jim Sallee, Gary Solon, Roger von Haefen, Sarah West, and seminar participants at the University
of Michigan, University of California Energy Institute, NBER Summer Institute, Michigan State University,
Triangle Resource and Environmental Economics Seminar, MIT, and NBER. I thank the Minnesota
Department of Commerce and the American Lung Association of Minnesota for providing retail ethanol
price and sales volume data, the Minnesota Department of Public Safety for providing vehicle registration
data, and the U.S. Department of Transportation for providing vehicle sales data. I thank the University
of Michigan's Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy and Rackham Graduate School for research
funding. I thank Eric Ravnikar for valuable research assistance. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge financial
support from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Science to Achieve Results
(STAR) Graduate Fellowship program. EPA has not officially endorsed this publication and the views
expressed herein may not reflect the views of the EPA. All errors are my own. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Soren T. Anderson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.The Demand for Ethanol as a Gasoline Substitute
Soren T. Anderson




This paper estimates household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute. I develop a theoretical
model linking the shape of the ethanol demand curve to the distribution of price ratios at which individual
households switch fuels. I estimate the model using data from many retail fueling stations. Demand
is price-sensitive with a mean elasticity of 2.5–3.5. I find that preferences are heterogeneous with many
households willing to pay a premium for ethanol. This reduces the simulated cost of an ethanol content
standard, since some households choose ethanol without large subsidies; simulated costs are still high
relative to likely environmental benefits.
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sta@msu.edu1 Introduction
Policies to reduce oil consumption increasingly promote ethanol and other biofuels through subsi-
dies, mandates, and funding for research. Proponents argue that substituting toward biofuels will
enhance energy security, reduce carbon dioxide emissions, improve air and water quality, and ben-
eﬁt farmers. Many recent policies mandate, either explicitly or implicitly, a minimum market share
for ethanol. A prime example is the U.S. Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), which will increase
ethanol use to about 25% of gasoline consumption in the coming years. Despite this attention
from policymakers, relatively little is known about household preferences for biofuels or the effect
that ethanol mandates will have on gasoline markets. This information is critical for designing,
implementing, and evaluating policies to promote ethanol and other biofuels.
Iaddressthisimportantresearchneedbyestimatingdemandforethanolasagasolinesubstitute.
I ﬁnd that demand for ethanol is sensitive to relative prices, with an average elasticity of about 2.5–
3.5. These are the ﬁrst available estimates in the literature for the price elasticity of household
ethanol demand, which is a key parameter for studies that analyze a retail ethanol subsidy or
mandate. I ﬁnd that elasticities are substantially smaller in magnitude (and less variable) than
they would be if fuel-switching behavior were concentrated around a single price. Rather, fuel-
switching behavior extends over a wide range of prices where ethanol is discounted 0%–25%
below gasoline. These results imply that many households are willing to pay a per-mile premium
for ethanol and that preferences for ethanol among these households are actually quite diffuse.
These results have important implications for policy. Previous analyses assume that households
are identical and that preferences depend exclusively on ethanol’s fuel-economy performance rel-
ative to gasoline (Holland, Knittel and Hughes 2008). This assumption can yield misleading re-
sults if some households also value ethanol for its perceived environmental and social beneﬁts.
In simulations, I ﬁnd that accounting for households that prefer ethanol can substantially reduce
the economic efﬁciency cost of a hypothetical ethanol content standard (i.e., a minimum market-
share requirement), since households with strong preferences choose ethanol without large price
subsidies. Similar intuition likely applies for policies to promote other “green” substitutes, such
1as renewable electricity, energy-efﬁcient light bulbs and appliances, hybrid-electric vehicles, and
organic foods.
I begin my analysis by developing a model of household utility in which inputs of ethanol and
gasoline combine linearly to produce household transportation services. The key parameter in this
model is the relative price at which the household is indifferent between relying entirely on either
fuel. When this parameter varies continuously among households, aggregate demand for ethanol
is a smooth function of relative fuel prices. Thus, the model formalizes the precise, theoretical link
between the distribution of preferences for ethanol and the shape of the aggregate demand curve,
allowing me to recover micro preferences from aggregate data.
I estimate the model using a unique dataset that contains nearly 5000 monthly observations for
ethanol prices and sales volumes at over 200 individual retail fueling stations in Minnesota during
1997–2006. These data provide a rare and valuable opportunity to document household prefer-
ences for biofuels, whose market shares have generally been too small to be included in household
surveys or reported separately from gasoline in aggregate measures. I use these data to estimate
demand for ethanol as a function of relative fuel prices. Consistent with my theoretical model,
which implies that price elasticities might vary dramatically, I estimate demand as a ﬂexible func-
tion of relative fuel prices using semi-parametric methods. Previous empirical studies of demand
for alternative fuels and gasoline varieties with close substitutes do not allow for this potentially
important ﬂexibility.
I use the distribution of preferences implied by my econometric estimates to simulate the ef-
fects of a national ethanol content standard. I ﬁnd that a 25% standard would decrease gasoline
consumption by about 20% and would cut carbon dioxide emissions from gasoline by about 10% at
an annual efﬁciency cost of roughly $20 billion. Efﬁciency losses derive primarily from ethanol’s
higher marginal production cost. Costs average about $180 per metric ton of carbon dioxide emis-
sions avoided, which is substantially higher than most estimates for marginal external damages,
or about $0.80 per gallon of gasoline saved, which exceeds most estimates for the external cost
associated with petroleum dependence.
2The empirical economic literature on demand for biofuels is miniscule.1 While an immense lit-
erature estimates demand for gasoline, the vast majority of studies focus on the response of overall
fuel demand to changes in fuel price levels. Because households have relatively few transportation
alternatives, fuel demand in the short run is price inelastic.2 This paper in contrast focuses on fuel-
switching behavior and how demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute responds to changes in
relative fuel prices. Because households that purchase ethanol in my sample are able to substitute
easily between ethanol and gasoline, demand for ethanol is price elastic.
Within the fuel demand literature, this paper is most similar to studies that estimate demand for
particular fuels with close substitutes, including full-service and self-serve gasoline (Phillips and
Schutte 1988) and regular and premium gasoline in both leaded and unleaded varieties (Greene
1989). These studies ﬁnd own-price and cross-price elasticities that exceed 10 in absolute value.
Elasticities also tend to be large for other goods with close substitutes, including breakfast cereals
(Nevo 2001), brand-name and generic pharmaceutical products (Ellison, Cockburn, Griliches and
Hausman 2006), and individual components of money supply (Barnett, Fisher and Serletis 1992).
I improve on this vein of the gasoline demand literature by formalizing fuel-switching behavior in
terms of the distribution of household preferences for alternative fuels, using instrumental variables
(IV) techniques to identify demand behavior more credibly, and estimating ﬂexible econometric
models to test whether elasticities vary with relative fuel prices.3
This paper also contributes to the literature showing how to interpret IV estimates in the pres-
ence of heterogeneous treatment effects. Following Angrist, Graddy and Imbens (2000), I go
1Rask (1998) estimates intermediate demand for ethanol as a 10% blending component in gasoline. He does
not estimate household demand. Alves and Bueno (2003) estimate aggregate demand for gasoline in Brazil, which
requires 25% ethanol blending in all gasoline, and where ethanol comprises roughly 40% of the non-diesel fuels
market (Perkins and Barros 2006). They do not estimate price responses for ethanol. Salvo and Huse (2010) ﬁnd
that the correlation between ethanol and gasoline prices in Brazil increased in the mid 2000s after the introduction of
ﬂexible-fuel vehicles, which allow consumers to arbitrage between the two fuels. They do not model heterogeneous
preferences, and they do not estimate demand.
2Using a variety of methods, Davis and Kilian (2010) estimate price elasticities ranging from roughly  0:1 to
 1:1. For relatively recent surveys see Graham and Glaister (2002), Espey (1996; 1998), and Dahl and Sterner
(1991). Recent studies indicate that the price response may have declined even further in recent decades (Hughes,
Knittel and Sperling 2008; Kilian 2008)
3Hausman and Newey (1995) and Yatchew and No (2001) estimate gasoline demand using a semi-parametric
approach and other ﬂexible methods. They do not model fuel switching.
3beyond the standard testing for whether my instruments predict prices (i.e., F-tests for instrument
relevance) and develop a heuristic approach to analyze where in the demand function my instru-
ments actually induce price variation. This analysis allows me to determine which section(s) of
the demand function I estimate using instrumental variables. Such an approach may prove useful
in future applications.
The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of ethanol in the fuels market,
ethanol’s environmental effects, and ethanol production and distribution. Section 3 presents a
model of household demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute, aggregates households to give an
expression for market demand, and relates the distribution of household preferences to aggregate
price responses. Section 4 describes the data I use to estimate the model, providing descriptive
statistics that summarize supply and demand behavior. Section 5 outlines the econometric model,
discusses identiﬁcation, and presents my results. Section 6 uses the distribution of preferences
implied by these estimates to simulate the effects of a national ethanol content standard. Section 7
concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Ethanol’s role in the fuels market
Ethanol is an alcohol fuel that in the United States derives primarily from corn. Gasoline blenders
mix ethanol with gasoline to comply with federal air quality regulations, to produce mid-grade and
premium fuels, and to satisfy the federal RFS. Virtually all gasoline vehicles can burn fuel blends
that contain 10% ethanol or less. While blenders sometimes use ethanol as a gasoline substitute
when ethanol prices are low, ethanol’s primary role is as a gasoline complement. Blenders added
about 5 billion gallons of ethanol to gasoline in 2006, or about 3.5% of gasoline consumption by
volume; blending has since doubled to 10 billion gallons or 7.3% of consumption in 2009. Ethanol
is heavily subsidized, with direct federal and state payments to ethanol producers, a federal tax
subsidy of $0.45 per gallon for blenders, and a tariff of $0.54 per gallon that applies to all but a
4nominal quantity of imports.
The market for ethanol as a direct gasoline substitute is small but growing rapidly. Stimulated
by rising gasoline prices and supported by federal, state, and local subsidies for alternative-fuel
vehicles and infrastructure, the number of retail stations offering E85—an alternative fuel blend
of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline—more than doubled during 2006–2009 to over 1900 stations
nationwide. Here and throughout, I refer to E85 simply as “ethanol” or, when necessary to avoid
confusion, as “retail ethanol.”4 On the consumer side of this market, the federal Alternative Motor
Fuels Act of 1988 created strong incentives under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards program for automakers with binding CAFE constraints to produce ﬂexible-fuel vehicles
capable of burning both ethanol and gasoline. Automakers produced about 5 million of these
vehicles between 2000 and 2006, and production continues apace.
The federal RFS, which Congress ﬁrst established in 2005 and then expanded in late 2007, sets
a minimum quantity of renewable fuel each year from 2008–2022, increasing gradually from 9
to 36 billion gallons. Industry is currently using ethanol to comply with the standard, and this is
likely to continue. The quantity standard for 2022 is about 25% of current gasoline consumption.
Although the standard mandates a minimum quantity of renewable fuel, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) implements the standard as a percentage of projected fuel consumption.
Below I simulate the effects of a 25% ethanol content requirement for gasoline, which is modeled
roughly on the RFS for 2022.
Only ﬂexible-fuel vehicles are certiﬁed to run on fuel blends containing more than 10% de-
natured ethanol. These vehicles have larger fuel injectors as well as fuel-system components that
are more resistant to corrosion. Earlier models also had special fuel sensors. These components,
which increase production costs no more than $100–$200, allow the vehicles to burn retail ethanol,
regular gasoline, or any combination of the two. Ethanol has lower energy content than gasoline,
implying fewer miles per gallon. The ratio of gasoline to retail ethanol mileage is about 1.35,
4I distinguish retail ethanol from “denatured ethanol,” which is blended with gasoline to produce retail fuels.
Denatured ethanol is nearly pure alcohol but with a small quantity of gasoline or other chemical added, making it unﬁt
for human consumption.
5which means that retail ethanol’s mileage is about 1 1=1:35  25% lower.5 Thus, households
that care only about minimizing fuel costs will demand a 25% price discount for retail ethanol.
2.2 Ethanol’s environmental and social effects
It has been estimated that replacing one gallon of gasoline with pure corn-based ethanol reduces
net petroleum consumption by 0.95 gallons, after accounting for upstream petroleum inputs and
ethanol’s lower mileage (Farrell, Plevin, Turner, Jones, O’Hare and Kammen 2006). Ethanol’s
climate beneﬁts are less impressive. Corn collects energy from the sun and absorbs carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere as it grows, but ethanol production from corn is energy-intensive. Corn farm-
ing uses a lot of fertilizer, and the ethanol reﬁning process uses a lot of heat. These inputs derive
largely from natural gas given current production techniques. As a result, ethanol only reduces net
carbon dioxide emissions by 15% after accounting for upstream energy inputs and ethanol’s lower
mileage(Farrelletal.2006). Infact, ethanolmayinsomecasesincreaseemissions, afterfurtherac-
counting for direct and indirect land-use changes associated with growing feedstocks (Searchinger,
Heimlich, Houghton, Dong, Elobeid, Fabiosa, Tokgoz, Hayes and Yu 2008; Fargione, Hill, Tilman,
Polasky and Hawthorne 2008).
The local air and water quality beneﬁts of ethanol are mixed. Ethanol is an oxygenate that
reduces carbon monoxide emissions in older engines, improving air quality, but modern engines
and pollution-control equipment largely obviate these beneﬁts. Ethanol reduces tailpipe emissions
of benzene (a known human carcinogen) but increases emissions of acetaldehyde (a possible car-
cinogen) and nitrogen oxide (a precursor to ozone and smog). Ethanol displaces environmentally
harmful petroleum reﬁning, but corn production increases fertilizer and pesticide use on environ-
mentally sensitive land. Finally, some policymakers worry about ethanol’s role in driving up food
prices.
5Using Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates for combined city and highway driving, I calculate
the ratio of regular gasoline to retail ethanol mileage for each ﬂexible-fuel vehicle model offered between 2000 and
2006 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2000-2006). EPA did not test vehicles using both fuels until 2000, but
relatively few ﬂexible-fuel vehicle models were offered prior to 2000. I calculate the sales-weighted mean ratio using
data for nationwide sales of individual ﬂexible-fuel vehicle models from the U.S. Department of Transportation.
6Household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute vary considerably. First, ethanol’s
relative mileage varies across vehicles and driving scenarios, even in highly controlled government
tests. On the road, some households drive primarily in stop-and-go city trafﬁc, while others log a
large fraction of highway miles. These and other differences may affect relative mileage. Second,
many households internalize ethanol’s perceived beneﬁts. More than half of the drivers in a recent
nationwide poll expressed interest in owning a ﬂexible-fuel vehicle (Harris Interactive 2006). Of
these, nearly 90% were motivated by reducing oil dependence, while nearly two-thirds wanted
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Over 90% of the drivers in another poll would prefer to
own a ﬂexible-fuel vehicle. When asked about ethanol’s beneﬁts, they cited “renewable fuel,”
“clean fuel,” “made in America,” and “more economical” with roughly equal frequency (Phoenix
Automotive 2006).
2.3 Ethanol production and distribution
There were about 100 ethanol reﬁneries nationwide in 2006, and the number has since doubled
to over 200 in 2009. Most reﬁneries are located in the corn belt, although a handful are located
outside of the Midwest.
Nearly all denatured ethanol is blended with gasoline in ratios less than 10%. Most blending
occurs at fuel blending and distribution terminals, which are located strategically near population
centers throughout the country. Terminal operators blend gasoline, ethanol, and other components
into ﬁnished products and then distribute fuel by tanker truck to individual retail stations. A rela-
tively small share of ethanol blending occurs at ethanol reﬁneries that have infrastructure for fuel
blending.
Fuel terminals receive most gasoline by pipeline from oil reﬁneries. Existing pipelines are not
suitable for transporting ethanol, however, since ethanol can corrode gasoline pipelines, and since
water accumulating in the pipelines can mix with and contaminate ethanol. Moreover, existing
pipelines connect large oil reﬁneries with cities, whereas ethanol reﬁneries are usually located in
rural areas. In the corn belt, tanker trucks deliver ethanol from ethanol reﬁneries to fuel terminals.
7Ethanol traveling from the Midwest to the coasts usually goes by rail.
Retail ethanol is readily available wherever large quantities of denatured ethanol are blended
with gasoline. In Minnesota, for instance, retail ethanol is available at virtually every fuel terminal
any time of year, because Minnesota has required 10% ethanol blending in all gasoline year-round
since October 1997. Terminal operators maintain stocks of fuel and sometimes lease storage fa-
cilities to retail chains who manage their own fuel stocks. Retail ethanol is also readily available
at a handful of ethanol reﬁneries that have infrastructure for fuel blending. Retail ethanol stations
in states such as Minnesota have no difﬁculty resupplying on short notice, given ethanol’s wide
availability for gasoline blending.
3 Theoretical model
To motivate my empirical analysis, I develop a model of demand for ethanol as a gasoline substi-
tute. The model formalizes the precise link between the distribution of household preferences and
the shape of the aggregate demand function.
3.1 The household’s problem
For the moment I assume that each household owns a single ﬂexible-fuel vehicle. The household’s
utility is quasilinear in transportation services v() and other goods:
v(e+rg)+x; (1)
where v() is strictly increasing and strictly concave, e is consumption of ethanol, g is consumption
of regular gasoline, x is consumption of all other goods, and r is the rate at which the household
converts gallons of regular gasoline into ethanol-equivalent gallons. Ethanol and gasoline are per-
fect substitutes. That is, utility is deﬁned over a linear combination of ethanol and gasoline, which
I call ethanol-equivalent fuel. When a household cares only about miles traveled the conversion
8rate r exactly equals the ratio of the household’s mileage when burning gasoline to its mileage
when burning ethanol. This ratio will vary across households due to minor differences in relative
mileage. More importantly, some households will value ethanol for its perceived environmental
or social beneﬁts.6 By embodying mileage differences and these other factors, r fully summarizes
household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute.
The household’s budget constraint is given by
y  pee  pgg x = 0; (2)
where pe and pg are the prices of ethanol and gasoline, y is income, and I have normalized the
price of the composite good to $1.
Which fuel will the household choose?7 Because ethanol and gasoline combine linearly in the
utility function, the household will be at a corner solution and will purchase ethanol exclusively
when pe < pg=r and gasoline exclusively when pg=r < pe. That is, the household will choose the
fuel with the lower ethanol-equivalent price. For a household that cares only about mileage, this
amounts to choosing the fuel that is least costly per mile. Equivalently, the household will choose
ethanol when the conversion rate r is less than the price ratio pg=pe. Because the conversion rate
r equals the relative price where fuel switching occurs, I also refer to it as the fuel-switching price
ratio.
While relative prices determine the type of fuel that a household chooses, quantity demanded
depends on absolute price levels, with the household equating the marginal utility of ethanol-
equivalent fuel consumption to the ethanol-equivalent price of whichever fuel it chooses. For
households that choose ethanol, the optimal quantity of ethanol demanded is therefore given by
e = q(pe); (3)
6In addition, the relative convenience of ﬁlling up with ethanol might vary somewhat across households, given the
fuel’s limited availability; I argue below that this source of variation is not particularly important in my data.
7I assume that the household always buys fuel but never spends its full income on fuel. Assuming that v0(0) > 1
ensures that the household buys fuel. Assuming that y is sufﬁciently large, so that v0(y=pe) < 1 and v0(ry=pg) < 1,
guarantees that the household does not spend its full income on fuel.
9where I have deﬁned ethanol-equivalent fuel demand as q(p)  v0 1(p) given ethanol-equivalent





where the presence of r converts ethanol-equivalent gallons into nominal gallons of gasoline. I
assume that households that do not own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles (or are otherwise unable to buy
ethanol) face the same maximization problem, which implies that their gasoline demand is also
given by equation (4).
3.2 Aggregate demand
Because ethanol and gasoline are perfect substitutes, households that own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles
sort into ethanol buyers and gasoline buyers according to their fuel-switching price ratios. While
each individual household rests at a corner solution, aggregate demand will be a smooth function
of relative prices when fuel-switching price ratios are distributed continuously.
To move formally from individual to aggregate demand, I ﬁrst assume that there are N (techni-
cally, an inﬁnite number of measure N) households in the market. Each household owns a single
vehicle, and a fraction f of these are ﬂexible-fuel vehicles. I next assume that fuel-switching
price ratios are distributed according to the differentiable cdf H(r), deﬁned on [0;¥). Recall from
above that households will choose ethanol if their fuel-switching price ratios are less than the rel-
ative price pg=pe. So the fraction of households that choose ethanol is simply the cdf evaluated
at this relative price: H(pg=pe). I assume for convenience that v() and ﬂexible-fuel ownership
are distributed independently of r (and of each other), so that fuel-switching price ratios are the
only relevant source of heterogeneity in the model. I discuss the validity of this independence
assumption below.











where ¯ q()  E[q()] is expected ethanol-equivalent fuel demand for an individual household
(which by independence does not depend on r). Aggregate demand is simply the total number
of households, multiplied by the fraction that own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles, multiplied by the fraction
of these that choose ethanol (which depends on relative prices), multiplied by average ethanol con-
sumption among households that choose ethanol (which depends on the absolute price of ethanol).
The appendix provides similar expressions for aggregate gasoline demand and aggregate welfare,
which are important for the policy simulation below.






+ln ¯ q(pe); (6)
This equation is critical because it relates fuel prices and ethanol quantities to the distribution of
household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute. As is clear from the equation, tracing
out the precise shape of the demand curve as a function of relative prices will reveal the underlying
cdf of fuel-switching price ratios.
Differentiating (6) with respect to pg and then multiplying by pg yields the gasoline-price















where h(r)  H0(r). This cross-price elasticity quantiﬁes the rate at which consumers switch from
regular gasoline to ethanol given a percent increase in the price of gasoline. A 1% increase in
11gasoline prices leads to a xg% increase in the quantity of ethanol demanded. Observe that this
elasticity is also the elasticity of ethanol’s market share (i.e., the fraction of households that choose
ethanol) with respect to the price ratio. Thus, I also refer to this elasticity as the fuel-switching
elasticity.































where I have deﬁned xf  p¯ q0(p)=¯ q(p). The ﬁrst term in (8), which I refer to as the price elasticity
of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand, quantiﬁes the rate at which individual households
respond to the price increase (on average) by curtailing demand. The second term in (8), which
is identical to the gasoline-price elasticity in (7) multiplied by negative one, quantiﬁes the rate at
which households switch from ethanol to gasoline as the price of ethanol increases. Again, this is
the fuel-switching elasticity (i.e., the elasticity of ethanol’s market share with respect to the price
ratio), this time multiplied by negative one. Together these terms imply that a 1% increase in
ethanol prices leads to a  xe% decrease in the quantity of ethanol demanded.











is the hazard rate for exiting the ethanol market as the price ratio decreases. That is, expression (9)
gives the instantaneous rate at which households switch to gasoline given a marginal decrease in
the price ratio, conditional on choosing ethanol.
Given any distribution of fuel-switching price ratios, equation (7) speciﬁes precisely how elas-
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(b) r  N(1:25;0:30)
Figure 1: Hypothetical preference distributions and elasticity functions
Note: Figure illustrates the relationship between the density function for fuel-switching price ratios and
the fuel-switching elasticity, as given by equation (7), for two hypothetical density functions.
dramatically, depending on the shape of the distribution. For this reason, imposing a constant
elasticity in empirical applications may yield misleading results. Given a sufﬁciently ﬂexible es-
timate of the elasticity function, however, the equation shows how to recover the distribution of
fuel-switching price ratios.
Figure 1 illustrates this relationship. When households are nearly identical, as in ﬁgure 1(a),
fuel-switching behavior is concentrated around a single price ratio, which leads to a large and
highly variable price response in that neighborhood. When households are literally identical, as
previous studies assume, aggregate demand mirrors individual demand: the entire market is at a
corner solution, with all households choosing the fuel with the lowest ethanol-equivalent price. In
terms of ﬁgure 1(a), this assumption implies a mass point of individuals at the same fuel-switching
price ratio, an inﬁnite price response at that single point, and a zero elasticity everywhere else. This
extreme assumption has important implications for policy analysis. If ethanol has relatively high
costs, so that no ethanol is consumed in the unregulated equilibrium, large distortions in market
prices may be required to induce households to choose ethanol.
When households are heterogeneous, however, as in ﬁgure 1(b), price elasticities are much
13smaller in magnitude and less variable. Fuel switching extends over a wide range of relative prices,
and demand is not especially sensitive to prices at any particular point. In this case, households
with particularly strong preferences for ethanol can be induced to purchase the fuel with less severe
distortion of market prices.
In theory, the model also provides a method for disentangling extensive-margin price responses
associated with fuel-switching behavior from intensive-margin responses associated with overall
fuel demand. Adding equations (7) and (8) demonstrates that the price elasticity of individual
ethanol-equivalent fuel demand is simply the sum of the two aggregate elasticities:
xf = xe+xg: (10)
For a precise quantitative interpretation of this elasticity, consider a simultaneous 1% increase in
both fuel prices. No fuel switching occurs, because relative prices do not change, but households
that choose ethanol reduce their demand by xf%. Put differently, a 1% increase in the price of
ethanol generates both fuel-switching behavior and conservation, while a 1% increase in the price
of gasoline only generates the former; thus, the difference in magnitude between these two price
responses equals the conservation effect.
4 Data and summary statistics
I estimate the model of logged aggregate ethanol demand in equation (6) above using monthly data
for ethanol prices and sales volumes at a large number of retail fueling stations, gasoline prices
in those same areas, and several ancillary variables. Table 1 presents summary statistics for my
estimation sample.
14Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
sales volume (gallons) 3352.71 3977.99 6.90 37770.50
retail ethanol price 1.74 0.35 0.74 2.96
retail gasoline price 1.98 0.43 1.10 3.00
retail gasoline / ethanol price 1.14 0.10 0.74 1.69
wholesale ethanol price 1.27 0.56 0.45 3.03
wholesale gasoline price 1.39 0.45 0.44 2.33
wholesale gasoline / ethanol price 1.17 0.33 0.69 2.45
ethanol pump age (months) 29.08 24.27 1.00 110.00
number ﬂexible-fuel vehicles in county 3252.61 4804.87 0.00 24453.00
number ethanol pumps in county 3.72 2.75 1.00 13.00
number gas stations in county 96.69 110.68 4.00 357.00
distance to Benson reﬁnery (miles) 112.47 43.89 4.63 242.18
Note: Table is based on estimation sample of 4,825 monthly reports from 232 fueling stations in Minnesota
between October 1997 and November 2006. Prices are in 2006 dollars. See text for details.
4.1 Data sources
These data come from several sources. My data for retail ethanol prices and sales volumes
come from a Minnesota Department of Commerce and American Lung Association of Minnesota
monthly survey of retail ethanol stations in Minnesota. Stations that received funding to help de-
fray ethanol infrastructure costs are required to respond, while other stations may participate on a
voluntary basis. This requirement is not strongly enforced, however, and stations do not always
report as required. The earliest stations began reporting in October 1997, and the data include
records through November 2006.8
Stations report volume-weighted prices derived from monthly sales volumes and revenues.
Retail prices include federal, state, and local fuel taxes. State and federal fuel taxes did not change
during my sample period. The data also record open and close dates for all retail ethanol pumps
in Minnesota and the county in which each pump is located. I use this information to calculate
8The data include records for a handful of state-operated stations; I ignore these stations in my analysis, because
they are only open to government ﬂeets. While government ﬂeets are able to purchase ethanol from private stations,
private ﬂexible-fuel vehicles outnumber government ﬂexible-fuel vehicles 100 to 1 in the Midwest Corts (2010).
Minnesota’s governor issued an executive order requiring state-owned ﬂexible-fuel vehicles to ﬁll up using ethanol
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Figure 2: Relative retail prices and ethanol sales volumes
Note: Ethanol sales volume in ﬁgure (a) is the monthly average volume of ethanol sales among reporting
ethanol stations in Minnesota; the ratio of gasoline to ethanol prices is the volume-weighted sample-mean
price of gasoline divided by the volume-weighted sample-mean price of ethanol. Figure (b) is the empirical
distribution of relative prices (i.e., percent price discounts for ethanol) in the estimation sample.
the total number of stations operating retail ethanol pumps in each county in each month and the
length of time that each pump has been operating, both of which I include as control variables. I
match these retail ethanol data to county-average retail prices for regular gasoline from Oil Price
Information Service (OPIS). I convert all prices to real 2006 prices using the monthly consumer
price index from the U.S. Department of Labor.
My data report geographic coordinates for many (but not all) stations. Using these coordinates,
I attempted to assign brand afﬁliations (if any) to the stations in my sample.9 I am unable to
identify 14% of stations (accounting for only 5% of my observations), due to missing or inaccurate
coordinates, and some of the brand afﬁliations that I assign to stations are possibly incorrect, due
to inaccurate coordinates and changing afﬁliations over time. While these problems (and station
ﬁxed effects) rule out using brand dummies directly in my estimating equation, I do use the brand
afﬁliations to construct my price instruments, as I discuss below.
9After locating the coordinates in Google Maps, I searched for the nearest gasoline station and recorded its name. I
attempted to corroborate this information using a MN Department of Commerce list of stations operating in Minnesota
as of late 2006, a similar list from the National Ethanol Vehicle Coalition, and the U.S. Department of Energy’s
database of alternative fueling stations (which includes the date the station was added to the database, which is highly
correlated with open date).
16Figure 2(a) plots relative retail prices over time. Relative prices vary considerably during the
sample period, with the relative price of gasoline trending upward. Average ethanol sales also
increase steadily over time. The relationship is not necessarily causal, however, as the increase in
sales volume is also consistent with a growing stock of ﬂexible-fuel vehicles. I am careful in my
estimation to control explicitly for ﬂexible-fuel vehicles and trends in fuel demand. Short-run in-
creases in the relative price of gasoline correlate with contemporaneous increases in ethanol sales
volumes, which is perhaps more suggestive of a price response. Again, however, this relation-
ship is not necessarily causal, as unmodeled shifts in aggregate demand might affect fuel prices.
Below, I discuss how I identify demand parameters using cross-sectional variation in pricing be-
havior. Figure 2(b) shows that retailers typically discount ethanol 0%-25% below gasoline; thus,
my estimates will reﬂect price responses within this range of the demand function.
As a measure of underlying fuel costs, I obtain wholesale ethanol price data from a trade
publication called Ethanol and Biodiesel News (previously known as Renewable Fuels News and
Oxy-Fuel News before that). These data measure weekly spot prices at fuel terminals for denatured
ethanol in Minneapolis and Fargo. I assign to each county (and thereby each station) the wholesale
price from whichever city is nearest. About four-ﬁfths of stations are located in counties nearest to
Minneapolis. I calculate the monthly average of these weekly prices and then subtract the federal
ethanol blending subsidy, which fell from $0.54 per gallon to $0.51 per gallon during my study
period. I obtain wholesale gasoline price data come from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (EIA). These data measure the volume-weighted monthly average spot price in Minnesota.
Although wholesale spot price data are available for additional Minnesota cities at a substantial
cost from proprietary sources, in practice these prices track each other closely (Minnesota Depart-
ment of Agriculture 2003). I use these wholesale price variables to construct my price instruments.
In addition to these price variables, I obtain data on ﬂexible-fuel vehicle registrations from the
Minnesota Department of Public Safety Division of Driver and Vehicle Services. These data record
vehicle identiﬁcation numbers (VINs), original sales dates, and owner zip codes for all vehicles





























































































(a) Vehicles and stations over time (b) Spatial distribution of stations
Figure 3: Flexible-fuel vehicles and retail ethanol stations
Note: Figure (a) shows the growth in the number of retail ethanol stations and the stock of ﬂexible-fuel
vehicles in Minnesota. Figure (b) shows the locations of Minnesota’s 264 retail ethanol fueling stations as
of August 2006. Minnesota measures 400 miles from north to south and about 250 miles along its southern
border. The shaded region is the seven-county metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul.
database by cross-referencing VINs with lists of ﬂexible-fuel vehicle models and VIN identiﬁers
from the National Ethanol Vehicle Coalition and from a private ﬁrm that collects data on the auto
industry. These vehicles represent about 3.3% of the 4.6 million light-duty vehicles registered in
Minnesota in 2007. I then use original sales dates to reconstruct a monthly time series for the stock
of ﬂexible-fuel vehicles in each county, which I include as a control variable.10
Figure 3(a) charts the growth in the number of retail ethanol stations and ﬂexible-fuel vehicles.
The ﬂexible-fuel stock grows at a roughly constant rate during the sample period, which is con-
sistent with CAFE standards that generated strong incentives for some manufacturers to produce a
limited number of ﬂexible-fuel vehicles each year. Growth in the number of retail ethanol stations
accelerated in 2000, when the American Lung Association negotiated an agreement with a partic-
ular retail chain to subsidize ethanol pumps at a large number of its stations. Growth accelerated
again in 2004-2005. High gasoline prices and low wholesale ethanol costs may have contributed
10I am unable to determine whether some vehicles are ﬂexible-fuel vehicles due to missing or invalid VINs, and
a relatively small number of ﬂexible-fuel vehicles are excluded due to missing sales dates or zip codes outside Min-
nesota. I am also unable to account for vehicle attrition or historical movements of vehicles in and out of Minnesota
and across county lines prior to 2007. Owner addresses also might differ from counties where ﬂexible-fuel vehicles
are actually driven. For these various reasons I measure ﬂexible-fuel stocks with some error.
18to this accelerated growth.
As I note above, I calculate the total number of retail ethanol stations in each county in each
month to quantify variation in competition, and I include this variable as a control. Figure 3(b)
maps the locations for all 264 retail ethanol stations in Minnesota as of August 2006 based on a
separate list of station addresses from the Minnesota Department of Commerce. I also calculate
the total number of retail gasoline stations operating in each Minnesota county in 2006 based on
station address information from the Minnesota Department of Commerce Weights and Measures
Division. Table 1, which assumes the same number of gas stations operating in each county for
1997-2006, shows that there are more than 20 gasoline stations for every ethanol station on average
inmysample.11 Whilecompetitioninfuelmarketsistypicallyﬁerce, mostethanolretailersoperate
as local monopolists in the narrower retail ethanol market. I use both measures of competition to
construct my price instruments.
My analysis covers the time period from October 1997 through November 2006. During this
time the number of private retail ethanol stations in Minnesota grew from less than 10 to nearly
250. Basedonreportedopenandclosedates, therewereabout7500potentialmonthlyobservations
at these stations. Approximately 64% of these potential observations are covered by the Minnesota
survey. The remaining 36% are missing, reﬂecting stations that almost never participate in the
survey, as well as stations that fail to report in just some months. This results in an estimation
sample of 4825 observations at 232 stations, implying an average panel size of about 21 months.
Some stations operate nearly the entire study period, while others operate for just a few months, as
is clear from ﬁgure 3(a).
My data are subject to several potential layers of selection. First, ethanol retailers might locate
in areas where preferences for ethanol are strongest. Ethanol pumps are spread throughout Min-
nesota, however, covering every major region except the sparsely populated northeast, which has
11The actual ratio is probably slightly higher. Although most of the nearly 2900 individual stations operating in
2006 were also operating during 1997-2005 (personal communication with Mark Buccelli of the Minnesota Bureau
of Weights and Measures), the total number of retail stations statewide declined about 7% from 1997–2006 (National
Petroleum News 2006).
19higher ethanol transport costs (being farther from ethanol reﬁneries).12 Rural areas are overrep-
resented, but infrastructure subsidies in the state were allocated so as to make ethanol as widely
available as possible. Minnesota itself has more pumps than other states, but the state has lower
ethanol transport costs (having many in-state ethanol reﬁneries) and has been receiving federally
funded infrastructure subsidies longer than most states.
Second, not all stations participate in the Minnesota survey, not all participating stations report
every month, and stations appear and disappear from the sample as they open and close over time.
Below, I test formally for biases related to an unbalanced panel and sample selection in my dataset,
ﬁnding no evidence for either.
Finally, ﬂexible-fuel owners might have systematically different preferences than other drivers.
Flexible-fuel owners tend to buy American, and they are more likely than other drivers to consider
minivans and pickups for their next purchase (Phoenix Automotive 2006). Furthermore, most
ﬂexible-fuelvehicleshaveidenticalgasoline-onlycounterparts, whichcouldleadtosortingdirectly
on ﬂexible-fuel capacity. On the other hand, automakers produce ﬂexible-fuel vehicles primarily to
comply with fuel-economy regulations. They market the vehicles all over the country, even in areas
where ethanol is not available, they sell the vehicles for the same prices as comparable gasoline-
only vehicles, and ﬂexible-fuel buyers are not observably different from buyers of comparable
gasoline vehicles (Anderson and Sallee 2010). In sum, while there is undoubtedly some selection
present in my data, it is not necessarily severe. Consistent with this judgment, I ﬁnd below that
price responses do not vary signiﬁcantly across sub-samples.
4.2 Retail pricing behavior and instruments
I spoke with industry representatives and inspected retail pricing behavior closely to identify price
variation that is arguably exogenous to demand.13 Retailers generally set prices using rule-of-
12Corts (2010) ﬁnds that ethanol availability within the Midwest is highly correlated with the presence of ﬂexible-
fuel vehicles and proximity to ethanol reﬁneries.
13I spoke with representatives from the largest retail chains in Minnesota that offer retail ethanol, as well as several
independently owned and operated stations, representatives from two ethanol reﬁneries that directly supply about one-
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(b) Discount over time (example)
Figure 4: Nominal price discounts
Note: Figure (a) shows the empirical distribution of ethanol’s nominal retail price discount relative to
gasoline in the estimation sample. Figure (b) shows ethanol’s nominal price discount relative to gasoline
for an example ethanol retailer over time.
thumb strategies. Most retailers price ethanol at a discount to regular gasoline in nominal incre-
ments of $0.10 per gallon, while some price at a ﬁxed nominal markup over wholesale ethanol.
This behavior is manifest in ﬁgure 4(a), which plots the distribution of nominal price discounts in
my sample, and is consistent with how retailers tell me they set prices.14
The industry representatives with whom I spoke indicated that discounts at individual stations
can sometimes persist at the same level for extended periods. Retailers update discounts primarily
to adjust for broad shifts in relative fuel costs; they do not deliberately adjust discounts in response
to local, short-term shifts in demand, which are probably not even detectable until after the fact.
This behavior is evident in ﬁgure 4(b), which plots the nominal discount for one station over time.
This station has been operating longer than most but its pricing behavior is fairly typical. This
behavior helps identify demand parameters: because retailers often set rule-of-thumb discounts
and maintain them for extended periods of time, unmodeled shifts in ethanol demand will tend not
to affect relative fuel prices, limiting the potential for price endogeneity.
The sizes of these discounts depend on underlying fuel costs as determined in the broader
survey.
14While this pricing behavior may appear suboptimal, ethanol sales are very low relative to gasoline (and not hugely


































































































































































































































(b) Dispersion of relative retail prices
Figure 5: Relative wholesale prices and relative retail fuel prices
Note: The ratios of gasoline to ethanol prices in ﬁgures (a) and (b) are the volume-weighted sample-mean
prices of gasoline divided by the volume-weighted sample-mean prices of ethanol. The dispersion of the
retail price ratio in ﬁgure (b) is the monthly standard deviation of the OLS residuals from the retail price
ratio regressed on a vector of month and station dummies. This variable quantiﬁes differential changes in
relative prices across stations.
markets for gasoline and fuel additives. Average discounts generally increase when wholesale
prices for denatured ethanol fall relative to gasoline, and discounts shrink when ethanol prices rise,
as is evident in ﬁgure 5(a). The economic causality is markedly one sided: events speciﬁc to the
tiny retail ethanol market have zero bearing on prices for crude oil, gasoline, or even denatured
ethanol, whose primary role is as a fuel additive. See the appendix for an extended discussion on
the determinants of wholesale fuel prices.
The key to my identiﬁcation strategy is that, for a variety of reasons, these changes in mar-
ket spot prices affect the ethanol retailers in my sample differently. One reason is the different
relationships the retailers have with their suppliers. As of 2006, about one third of ethanol retail-
ers in Minnesota bought ﬁnished fuel from an ethanol reﬁnery in Benson, which is a small town
in the southwestern part of the state. Throughout the entire sample period, this reﬁnery supplied
ethanol to retailers at a ﬁxed nominal discount below the spot price of gasoline. The retailers, in
turn, agreed by contract to pass this same discount along to consumers at their stations. 15 As a
15This unique pricing agreement ended in the fall of 2007. The ethanol reﬁnery now supplies retail ethanol at
market prices, and retailers are free to price ethanol at whatever price the market will bear. I am not aware of any
22result, relative prices are mechanically less variable at these stations. Other retailers have no such
contractual arrangement and therefore bear the full brunt of variation in relative spot prices, which
transmits to the retail level. Even among these other retailers, variation in contracts could lead to
variation in pricing behavior.16
Differences in local competition will also lead to variation in pricing behavior. Retail ethanol
prices will be more sensitive to changes in relative fuel costs for retailers facing greater competition
from other ethanol retailers, whereas retailers in less competitive areas will price largely based on
willingness to pay and will therefore be less sensitive to costs. In addition, stations facing different
levels of competition in the overall fuel market will also price differently. Where competition is
weak, consumers that do not buy ethanol at a given station will likely buy gasoline from the same
station instead; where competition is ﬁerce, these consumers are more likely to buy gasoline from
a different station altogether. Thus, differences in overall competition will also lead to variation in
pricing behavior. I make these points formally in the appendix.
This variation in pricing behavior is critical: it allows me to control for month effects common
to all stations and still identify demand parameters using differential changes in fuel prices across
stations. To quantify this variation, I regressed relative prices on a vector of month and station
effects and then computed the standard deviation of the residuals in each month. I refer to this
standard deviation as the dispersion of relative prices. Figure 5(b) shows that price dispersion
increaseswhengasolinespotpricesarehighrelativetoethanol. Thisbehaviorisconsistentwiththe
different supply relationships I document. Some stations have supply contracts that mechanically
tie retail ethanol prices to gasoline, while other stations purchase ethanol at spot prices and pass
these costs on to consumers. Price dispersion therefore increases whenever ethanol and gasoline
spot prices diverge. This behavior is also consistent with differences in competition. When ethanol
similar agreements between ethanol retailers and their suppliers.
16Larger retail chains generally have long-term contracts for denatured ethanol and blend their own fuel, whereas
smaller chains and independents buy fuel from terminal operators at market spot prices. Contract prices for denatured
ethanol are often tied directly to the price of gasoline, which means that relative fuel costs are less variable for larger
ﬁrms. In theory, the opportunity to sell fuel on the spot market should equalize marginal costs across these ﬁrms. Only
a small fraction of denatured ethanol actually trades on the spot market, however, and so it is possible that larger ﬁrms
with long-term contracts perceive their ethanol costs as being less variable. If so, then ethanol’s relative price may be
less variable at their retail stations.
23costs are low relative to gasoline, competitive retailers are forced to reduce prices, while less
competitive retailers are able to price closer to gasoline. Price dispersion therefore decreases as the
gap between ethanol costs and gasoline prices narrows.
To exploit this variation in pricing behavior, I construct three distinct sets of instruments. The
ﬁrst set (my “Brand” instruments) interact logged wholesale prices for ethanol and gasoline with
dummy variables for the 14 identiﬁable retail brands in my sample (28 variables total). These
instruments predict variation in pricing behavior related to chain-speciﬁc supply relationship and
idiosyncratic pricing strategies. The second set (my “Benson” instruments) interact logged whole-
sale prices with the logged distance between each county’s population-weighted center and the
Benson ethanol reﬁnery (2 variables total). These instruments predict variation in pricing behavior
related to having a supply contract with the Benson reﬁnery. Because ethanol is costly to trans-
port, the Benson reﬁnery is most likely to supply nearby stations. The third set (my “Competition”
instruments) interact logged wholesale prices with the logged numbers of ethanol and gasoline
retailers in each county (4 variables total). These instruments help predict variation in pricing be-
havior related to differences in local competition. I use these three sets of instruments to identify
variation in relative prices that is arguably exogenous to demand.
5 Econometric estimation and results
5.1 Econometric model
I estimate logged aggregate ethanol demand of the following form:






+b0Xit +gt +di+wi(t)+eit; (11)
where: volumeit is gallons of ethanol sold at fueling station i in month t; peit is the retail price of
ethanol and pgit is the retail price of regular gasoline; Xit is a vector of time-varying county and
station characteristics; gt is a month effect that is constant across all fueling stations; di is a fueling
24station effect that is constant across all time periods; wi(t) is a station-speciﬁc time trend; eit is
an unobserved station-month demand shifter; and the remaining elements are coefﬁcients, vectors
of coefﬁcients, and functions to be estimated. Note that regression (11) is the empirical analog of
logged aggregate demand in theoretical equation (6) above.17
While my main estimates assume that F() is linear, implying a constant fuel-switching elas-
ticity, my theoretical model implies that elasticities may vary dramatically with relative prices. I
test for variable elasticities using two approaches. First, I estimate the model using different sets of
instruments. In the presence of a variable elasticity response, different instruments may yield dif-
ferent estimates, if those instruments are inducing price variation at different points in the demand
function Angrist et al. (2000). I return to this issue below when interpreting my main results. Sec-
ond, I use OLS to estimate ﬂexible polynomial, cubic spline, and semi-parametric approximations
for F(). While it is well-known that OLS is a biased estimator of demand, I argue below that the
OLS bias in my application relatively mild.
The own-price elasticity of ethanol demand in this model is simply a F0(lnpg=pe). The
gasoline price elasticity is F0(lnpg=pe), which is equivalent to the fuel-switching elasticity. Fol-
lowing equation (10), the price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand is the sum of
the gasoline-price and own-price elasticities (i.e., the difference in magnitudes), which simpliﬁes
here to a. Thus, equation (11) imposes a constant price elasticity for overall fuel demand, which
is consistent with recent nonparametric estimates (Yatchew and No 2001). When F() is linear,
this model is equivalent to the standard linear-in-logs demand model, with constant own-price and
cross-price elasticities.
In my main estimates, I impose a =  0:20 rather than estimate it directly; this value is con-
sistent with previous estimates for the short-run price elasticity of fuel demand. I do this for two
reasons. First, efﬁciency. To pin down a precisely, I need to observe different stations charging the
17Unfortunately, I do not observe gasoline quantities below the state level, and so I am unable to calculate local
market shares. I am also unable to estimate the model using any alternative level of aggregation (e.g., zip code or
county), because I do not observe prices and sales volumes for every ethanol station. Ethanol stations tend to be
isolated from one another, however, with stations in my sample located 8 miles from their nearest competitors on
average. Thus, it is valid to treat the stations themselves as approximately distinct ethanol markets.
25same relative prices (so that fuel choice is held constant) but different price levels (so that quantity
demanded varies). Unfortunately, because gasoline prices vary little after controlling for month
and station effects, the variation needed to pin down a precisely does not exist, and attempting
to estimate it inﬂates the standard errors on the fuel-switching responses.18 Second, consistency.
While I argue that most variation in relative prices is orthogonal to demand, this same argument
does not hold for price levels. Thus, imposing a helps me mitigate endogeneity problems when
I estimate the model using OLS. I show below that my fuel-switching results are not particularly
sensitive to the choice of a, whether imposed or estimated freely.
Returning to the econometric model, the fueling station effect di controls for persistent differ-
ences in fueling station characteristics, such as brand name, location, and amenities. The station
effect also controls for persistent determinants of local fuel demand, including household income
and other demographics, driving habits, and vehicle efﬁciency. The month dummy variables given
by gt control for trends in demand related to growing awareness of ﬂexible-fuel vehicle capabilities
or rising state income levels. The station-speciﬁc time trends wi(t) control for similar factors that
evolve at different rates locally. Finally, the month dummies control for potential seasonality in
demand, including the well-known surge in driving that occurs each summer.19
The vector of time-varying station characteristics Xit includes the log of the county’s ﬂexible-
fuel vehicle stock. The vector also includes the log of the total number of stations that offer retail
ethanol in the same county. While a negative coefﬁcient would imply that new stations draw
customers away from existing stations, a zero coefﬁcient might only suggest that new stations
locate where competition is weak. This measure of competition reﬂects retailer choices about
when and where to install ethanol pumps, and these decisions presumably depend critically on the
locations of existing pumps. Table 1 indicates that there are less than 5 retail ethanol stations per
18After controlling for station effects, the month dummies explain just 42% of the variation in logged relative prices.
The remaining variation comes almost entirely from differences in ethanol prices across stations: the month dummies
explain 99.5% of the variation in logged gasoline prices but only 88% of the variation in logged ethanol prices.
19The minimum denatured ethanol content of retail ethanol in Minnesota varies seasonally due to cold weather
starting issues, ranging from 70% in the winter to 79% in the summer (U.S. Department of Energy 2006). Although
the month dummies control for seasonality in the level of demand, they do not control for potential seasonality in the
priceelasticityofdemandduetovariationindenaturedethanolcontent. Variationinethanolcontentisrelativelyminor,
however, and unlikely to be transparent to consumers, making it neither problematic nor useful for identiﬁcation.
26county, while there are more than twenty times as many gasoline stations. A ﬁnding of signiﬁcant
competition in retail ethanol markets would therefore be surprising. Finally, the vector of time-
varying station characteristics includes dummy variables that indicate the length of time that a
station has been offering ethanol. These dummy variables differ from the month dummy variables
because start dates vary from station to station. Sales will likely be low after a station ﬁrst opens
before customers are fully aware of the new opportunity to purchase ethanol.
5.2 Identiﬁcation
I estimate regression (11) using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS).
OLS estimates are potentially biased if unmodeled shifts in ethanol demand correlate with fuel
prices. This is a standard endogeneity problem in estimating demand functions. Shifts in ethanol-
speciﬁc demand would tend to bias the own-price elasticity toward zero, if such shifts led to higher
ethanol prices. In contrast, shifts in overall fuel demand would tend to increase prices for all
fuels, in which case relative prices would arguably be exogenous. This would facilitate identiﬁca-
tion using OLS because I am primarily interested in fuel-switching behavior, which only depends
on relative prices. Endogenous price levels would nevertheless bias OLS estimates for the price
elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand (when this parameter is estimated freely).
In practice, the station owners with whom I spoke indicated that they do not deliberately update
retail ethanol prices in response to local, short-term demand shifts. Rather, they price ethanol at
nominal discounts to regular gasoline (or markups over denatured ethanol), often maintain these
discounts for extended periods of time, and only adjust discounts in response to changes in un-
derlying fuel costs. Indeed, for a large fraction of stations in the sample, discounts are ﬁxed by
contract. This behavior largely rules out ethanol-speciﬁc demand shifts at individual stations being
correlated with station-level price changes and biasing OLS estimates.20
20Thereistheoreticaljustiﬁcationforretailersbeingunresponsivetolocaldemandshiftswhensettingrelativeprices.
For a monopolist ethanol retailer, relative retail prices will be invariant to demand shifts that enter multiplicatively
by scaling aggregate demand. This is because multiplicative demand shifts do not alter the shape of the own-price
elasticity function, leaving the monopolist’s ﬁrst-order pricing condition unchanged. See the appendix for benchmark
models of retail pricing behavior.
27Underlying fuel costs could still be endogeneous to local demand shifts, however, if such shifts
were correlated across many stations. That is, even if individual retailers are price takers in whole-
sale markets, their collective behavior could inﬂuence wholesale prices, meaning that wholesale
prices are not exogenous in an econometric sense (Kennan 1989). A classic example is the surge in
travel demand that drives up fuel prices each summer. I control for these and other correlated de-
mand shifts using month dummy variables. Finally, I control for any slowly evolving local demand
shifts using station-speciﬁc trends.
While these controls throw away potentially useful time-series and cross-sectional variation,
I am able to document a variety of contractual relationships between retail ethanol stations and
their wholesale suppliers, as well as variation in local competition, which lead to cross-sectional
variation in pricing behavior. To exploit this variation in pricing behavior, I construct three sets
of price instruments as described above. These instruments included logged wholesale ethanol
and gasoline prices interacted with: (1) station brand dummies, (2) logged distance to the Benson
reﬁnery, and (3) the logged numbers of ethanol and gasoline stations operating in the same county.
In effect, I am treating as exogenous the price variation that derives from different rule-of-thumb
pricing strategies, different supply relationships, and different levels of market competition inter-
acting with wholesale fuel prices, even though wholesale prices themselves are not necessarily
exogenous. In my OLS estimates, I also retain variation related to the idiosyncratic timing of when
individual stations adjust their rule-of-thumb discounts; this variation is valid so long as the size
and timing of such adjustments is exogenous, conditional on month and station effects.
Additional identiﬁcation issues arise in the context of an unbalanced and non-random sample
of stations. Stations appear and disappear from my dataset as they open and close pumps, join
the Minnesota survey, or fail to report. As long as these choices are uncorrelated with demand,
conditional on controls, then OLS estimates are consistent (Wooldridge 1995 2002). This seems
plausible, given that I explicitly control for fuel prices, station effects, month dummies, and other
likely determinants of selection. I tested this hypothesis formally by adding leads and lags of
selection indicators to the regression in equation (11). The F-statistic on these variables was highly
28insigniﬁcant, suggesting that standard selection bias is not a problem.21
A separate but related issue is that stations with long panel lengths will weigh heavily in the
estimates relative to stations with short panels, while stations without ethanol pumps receive no
weight at all. This is not a concern if the elasticity function F0() is the same everywhere. If the
elasticity function varies over time or across stations, however, and if the stations I observe are not
representative, then my estimates of the “average” elasticity function will be biased. I examine this
issue below by estimating price responses separately for different time periods and for different
regions. I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant disparities.
5.3 Estimation results
5.3.1 Constant elasticity estimates
Table 2 presents my main OLS and 2SLS estimation results, which impose a =  0:20 and also
assume a constant price elasticity for fuel-switching behavior. I control for station effects using
both ﬁxed-effects and ﬁrst-difference estimators, which have different efﬁciency properties in the
presence of serial correlation and different probability limits in the presence of dynamic price
responses. Below, I test the sensitivity of the results to alternative values of a and relax the as-
sumption of a constant fuel-switching elasticity.
Ethanol demand is sensitive to price changes. The coefﬁcient on logged relative prices in
regression (1), which is based on the OLS ﬁxed-effects estimator, implies that the elasticity of
ethanol’s market share with respect to relative prices is 2:730. The same coefﬁcient is 3:484 in
equation (2), which is based on the 2SLS ﬁxed-effects estimator. These results imply that the OLS
estimator is biased toward zero, which is consistent with the usual intuition. The implied bias is
only about 20%, however, which is consistent with my arguments above that most price variation
is orthogonal to demand. The corresponding elasticities based on the ﬁrst-difference estimator,
in regressions (3) and (4), are about 0:9 smaller in magnitude. Why? One possible explanation
21I added one-period leads and lags of a dummy variable, call it sit, that equals one if I observe data for station i in
month t and zero otherwise. I also added å
T
r>t sir. Wooldridge (1995; 2002) suggests adding å
T
r6=t sir and Õ
T
r6=t sir, but
neither has any time variation in my panel.
29Table 2: Main estimation results
Fixed effects First differences
Variable (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
ln(gas price / ethanol price) 2.730 3.484 1.872 2.613
(0.193) (0.406) (0.233) (0.562)
ln(number ﬂex-fuel vehicles) 0.048 0.059 0.095 0.096
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
ln(number ethanol stations) -0.097 -0.092 -0.035 -0.013
(0.077) (0.076) (0.092) (0.094)
month 1 of operation -0.648 -0.636 -0.688 -0.690
(0.100) (.099) (0.112) (0.112)
month 2 of operation -0.075 -0.069 -0.105 -0.106
(0.078) (0.077) (0.083) (0.083)
month 3 of operation 0.003 0.014 -0.033 -0.032
(0.068) (0.068) (0.058) (0.058)
month 4 of operation -0.014 -0.007 -0.036 0.034
(0.046) (0.046) (0.032) (0.033)
Number of observations 4825 4825 4148 4148
Number of stations 232 232 202 202
R-squared 0.18 0.13
Residuals AR(1) 0.422 0.444 -0.249 -0.246
(0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
F-statistic (weak instruments) 18.83 68.61
(Chi-square p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Hansen’s J-statistic (overidentiﬁcation) 45.956 34.165
(Chi-square p-value) (0.066) (0.412)
Note: Dependent variable is logged monthly ethanol sales volume in gallons; results impose an overall fuel demand
elasticity of  0:20. Clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation within stations. All regressions control for station effects, month dummy variables, and station-speciﬁc
time trends; R-squared is the fraction of remaining variation explained by the variables above. Residuals AR(1) is the
coefﬁcient from the least-squares regression of the residuals on their lagged values. F-statistic (for weak instruments)
tests the null that excluded instruments have no explanatory power in the ﬁrst-stage regression; robust p-values are in
parentheses. Hansen’s J-statistic (for overidentiﬁcation) tests the null that instruments are jointly uncorrelated with the
errors; robust p-values are in parentheses. See text for details.
is that demand does not respond fully to changes in relative fuel prices within the ﬁrst month, in
which case the ﬁxed-effects and ﬁrst-difference estimators may give different results. The ﬁrst-
difference estimator exploits the correlation between price and quantity changes in adjacent time
periods only, while the ﬁxed-effects estimator relates average sales volumes to relative fuel prices
in all time periods. For this reason, ﬁxed-effects estimates may be more robust to delayed price
responses.22
22Indeed, when I include lagged price variables, the ﬁxed-effects and ﬁrst-difference OLS estimates begin to con-
30The instruments appear to be performing well. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistics are highly signiﬁ-
cant: they indicate that the instruments are strong predictors of relative fuel prices, conditional on
covariates. At the same time, the Hansen’s J-statistics for overidentiﬁcation are not signiﬁcant: I
am unable to reject the null that the instruments are jointly uncorrelated with the error terms in
the model (and that the price elasticity is constant, as I discuss below), although the statistic is
borderline signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed-effects 2SLS model.
Standard errors in table 2 are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The
ﬁxed-effects estimates have slightly narrower conﬁdence intervals than the ﬁrst-difference esti-
mates. The errors are serially correlated for both estimators, however, and neither estimator is
fully efﬁcient.23
Table 3 presents elasticity estimates when imposing different values of a (in the ﬁrst four
rows) and estimating a freely (in the last row). The table omits results for the covariates, since
they change little. A clear pattern emerges: as the imposed value of a increases in magnitude, the
fuel-switching elasticity decreases by roughly the same magnitude. This is not surprising: logged
ethanol prices and logged relative prices are almost perfectly collinear; hence, the offsetting ef-
fects. When I attempt to estimate a freely, the standard error on the fuel-switching effect increases
substantially, while a itself is estimated imprecisely and has the wrong sign.24 I do not put much
stock in these estimates, however, given the inherent difﬁculty in pinning down a in this model. In
verge. Another possible explanation is I calculate relative fuel prices based on county-average gasoline prices. While
it is unclear that a different level of aggregation is more appropriate, measurement error will tend to bias the elasticity
estimates toward zero, and this bias is usually more severe in ﬁrst-difference estimates (Griliches and Hausman 1986).
The 2SLS estimator should correct for this bias, however, and so I suspect this is not the primary explanation.
23First-order serial correlation in the ﬁxed-effects residuals is about 0.40 and statistically different from zero. First-
order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-difference residuals is  0:25. This coefﬁcient is statistically different from zero,
which indicates that the ﬁrst-difference estimates are not efﬁcient. This coefﬁcient is also statistically different from
 0:5, which conﬁrms the inference based on the ﬁxed-effects residuals that the model’s errors in levels are serially
correlated (Wooldridge 2002). That  0:25   (1 0:40)=2 is consistent with the model’s errors following an AR(1)
process (Solon 1984).
24There are several possible explanations. First, a household’s overall fuel demand may be correlated with its fuel-
switching price ratio, which would violate my assumption that they are independent. Second, some households may be
responding to linear differences in fuel prices instead of relative prices. When I add the linear difference to the models
estimated using OLS ﬁxed-effects and ﬁrst-differences, however, its coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant, while a continues to
have the wrong sign and be insigniﬁcant. Lastly, if consumers respond to price changes with a delay, and this delay
is longer for ethanol prices, this could manifest as a positive coefﬁcient on a. When I add lagged price effects, the
coefﬁcient on a ﬂips signs for ﬁxed-effects estimation, but remains highly insigniﬁcant.
31Table 3: Sensitivity to different choices for a
Fixed effects First differences
Value of a OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
a =  0:00 2.927 3.679 2.069 2.816
(0.193) (0.406) (0.232) (0.561)
a =  0:10 2.829 3.582 1.970 2.715
(0.193) (0.406) (0.232) (0.562)
a =  0:20 (main results) 2.730 3.484 1.872 2.613
(0.193) (0.406) (0.233) (0.562)
a =  0:30 2.632 3.387 1.774 2.511
(0.194) (0.406) (0.233) (0.563)
a = freely estimated 3.465 4.320 2.777 3.613
(0.616) (3.669) (0.517) (1.224)
a itself 0.545 0.656 0.720 0.782
(0.607) (3.739) (0.433) (1.235)
Note: Table replicates the results in table 2 above while imposing different values for a (in the ﬁrst four rows) and
estimatingafreely(inthelastrow). Clusteredstandarderrors(inparentheses)arerobusttoarbitraryheteroskedasticity
and serial correlation within stations. See text and the previous table for details.
any case, the fuel-switching response is relatively stable, and I am unable to reject a =  0:20 or
any of the other reasonable values I impose in table 3.
Returningtotheestimatesintable2, thecoefﬁcientsonﬂexible-fuelvehiclestocksindicatethat
a 1% increase in the number of vehicles leads to a 0.05%-0.10% increase in ethanol sales volumes.
I had expected to ﬁnd coefﬁcients closer to 1, indicating that ethanol sales increase proportionally
with the density of potential buyers. I suspect that this estimate is biased toward zero, however, as
a result of measurement error, which is exacerbated in panel data models (Hausman 2001).25
The coefﬁcients in the next row indicate that a 1% increase in the number of ethanol pumps per
county leads to a 0.01%-0.10% reduction in sales volumes at individual stations; these coefﬁcients
arenotstatisticallydifferentfromzero. Conditionalonwhereretailerschoosetolocate, newpumps
draw only a small fraction of customers away from existing stations. This result is not surprising,
25Using my monthly panel of ﬂexible-fuel stocks, I regressed the logged number of ﬂexible-fuel vehicles on a vector
of station and month dummy variables. These controls explained 88% of the variation in ﬂexible-fuel stocks. Any
residual variation that remains is likely contaminated by measurement error, given that I construct my panel using a
snapshot of vehicles on the road in 2007. In addition to being noisy, my measure of ﬂexible-fuel stocks is likely biased,
as I systematically undercount vehicles from earlier time periods that may have exited Minnesota or been scrapped
prior to 2007. This is not a problem if the rate of exit and scrappage is similar across counties, however, because I
include month dummies.
32giventhesmallnumberofethanolpumpsstatewideandthefactthatinfrastructuresubsidestargeted
areas where ethanol was not already available.
The last set of coefﬁcients indicate that sales volumes are low in the ﬁrst several months after
a pump begins operating. Sales volumes are about exp( 0:70) 1  50% lower in the ﬁrst month
but quickly increase to long-run levels within a month or two. This rapid increase indicates that
market participants are well-informed about ethanol’s availability.
5.3.2 Instrumental variables interpretation
Angrist et al. (2000) show how to interpret linear (in logs) IV estimates of demand when the
underlying demand function is nonlinear. They show that IV returns a weighted average of the
elasticity response over the entire demand function. Roughly, weights are proportional to the
density of the data within the range of prices over which the instruments induce price variation. So,
for example, if the instruments only generate price variation in the high-price region of the demand
function, IV will reﬂect price elasticities in that region only. This interpretation is analogous to
the local-average treatment effect (LATE) interpretation for IV in the case of a discrete-valued
treatment variable.
This result has two implications. First, OLS and 2SLS estimates may differ, even when OLS is
unbiased, if the estimators are implicitly estimating different sections of the demand function. To
explore this possibility, I calculated the density of predicted prices from my ﬁrst-stage regression.
Figure 4(a) shows that the density of predicted prices overlaps closely with the density of observed
prices. Next, I calculated for each observation the marginal contribution that the instruments make
toward predicting prices in the ﬁrst-stage regression (i.e., the absolute value of the inner product of
the instruments with their ﬁrst-stage coefﬁcients). Figure 6(a) shows that the instruments induce
price variation everywhere, while ﬁgure 6(b) shows that the analogous identifying variation in OLS
is similarly distributed (except in the extremes of the data for a handful of observations). Thus,
I conclude that the OLS and 2SLS estimators are applying roughly similar weights to different
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Figure 6: Identifying variation in 2SLS and OLS estimates
Note: Figures show the identifying variation in 2SLS and OLS. Figure (a) shows: (1) the distribution
of ﬁrst-stage predicted prices from 2SLS (as well as the distribution of observed prices for comparison)
and (2) the absolute value of the inner product of the instruments with their ﬁrst-stage coefﬁcients scatter-
plotted versus the ﬁrst-stage predicted prices themselves. Figure (b) shows the analogous information for
OLS: (1) the distribution of observed prices and (2) the absolute value of the residuals from a regression
of observed prices on covariates scatter-plotted versus observed prices themselves. Note that 100 times
logged relative price is approximately equal to ethanol’s percent discount. See text for details.
A second, related implication is that different sets of instruments may give statistically different
estimates, either because one or more of the instruments is endogenous (the usual interpretation) or
because the instruments are estimating different sections of the demand function (the LATE-type
interpretation). I explore this issue by estimating model (11) separately using different combi-
nations of instruments. Table 4 presents the estimated fuel-switching price responses from these
2SLSregressions, aswellthe ﬁrst-stageF-tests(testing weakinstruments) andHansen’sJ-statistics
(testing overidentifying restrictions). The F-statistics are all signiﬁcant, implying that each subset
of instruments does a good job of predicting prices. Looking down the columns of ﬁxed-effects
and ﬁrst-difference 2SLS coefﬁcients, there is a noticeable pattern: models that include the brand
instruments have larger estimated elasticities. In general, however, the estimates are fairly con-
sistent across the different sets of instruments, and the J-statistics (with two exceptions) are all
insigniﬁcant. I take this as indirect evidence that the elasticity function is roughly constant over
the range of observed prices; I explore this issue in further detail below.
34Table 4: Robustness to alternative sets of instruments
Fixed effects First differences
Instrument set Coefﬁcient F-statistic J-statistic Coefﬁcient F-statistic J-statistic
None (main OLS results) 2.730 1.872
(0.193) (0.233)
All (main 2SLS results) 3.484 18.83 45.956 2.613 68.61 34.165
(0.406) (0.00) (0.066) (0.562) (0.00) (0.412)
Brand & Benson 3.756 19.98 35.992 2.601 73.08 30.784
(0.452) (0.00) (0.174) (0.543) (0.00) (0.376)
Brands & Competition 3.482 18.70 42.234 2.723 75.10 32.099
(0.400) (0.00) (0.086) (0.605) (0.00) (0.412)
Benson & Competition 2.896 43.12 11.011 1.503 6.13 4.594
(0.750) (0.00) (0.051) (0.695) (0.00) (0.467)
Brand only 3.814 20.05 27.699 2.706 71.15 29.017
(0.451) (0.00) (0.427) (0.616) (0.00) (0.360)
Benson only 2.274 47.66 1.337 1.987 8.73 0.045
(1.040) (0.00) (0.248) (0.762) (0.00) (0.832)
Competition only 2.966 49.95 10.186 1.558 9.24 3.372
(0.913) (0.00) (0.017) (0.851) (0.00) (0.338)
Note: Table shows 2SLS estimates for the fuel-switching price elasticity estimated using different sets of instruments.
Table also presents ﬁrst-stage F-statistics for weak instruments (with robust p-values in parentheses) and Hansen’s
J-statistics for overidentifying restrictions (with robust p-values in parentheses). See text for details.
5.3.3 Variable elasticity estimates
In addition to the indirect tests above, I estimate a variable elasticity function directly. Because
OLS does not appear to be severely biased in my application, I use OLS to estimate increasingly
ﬂexible polynomial, cubic spline, and non-parametric approximations for F(). Coefﬁcient esti-
mates on the covariates are similar to those in table 2 above, so I focus here on the fuel-switching
elasticities. For consistency with the above results, I impose a =  0:20; recall from above that the
magnitudes of the fuel-switching response and imposed a move in opposite directions.
Figures 7(a)–(b) plot the elasticity function based on a cubic polynomial approximation, esti-
mated using the OLS ﬁxed-effects and ﬁrst-difference estimators. Elasticities decline slightly in
magnitude as the ratio of gasoline to ethanol prices increases, but there is little curvature in the
elasticity function. Because the cubic model would have difﬁculty revealing sharp peaks in the
elasticity function, I also estimated more ﬂexible polynomial approximations. Elasticities based
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Figure 7: Estimated fuel-switching elasticities
Note: Figure shows the fuel-switching elasticity of aggregate ethanol demand based on ﬁxed-effects poly-
nomial, ﬁrst-differences polynomial, cubic-spline, and semi-parametric estimation. Solid gray lines are
95% conﬁdence intervals for estimates based on cubic polynomials, cubic spline with knots every 0.20,
and semi-parametric estimates with bandwidth 0.06. Conﬁdence intervals for semi-parametric estimates
are based on the standard errors from local polynomial regressions. See text for details.
tically different from the more restrictive cubic estimates.
Polynomial approximations are sensitive to the number of terms and to outliers, and the func-
tion in one region is sensitive to the ﬁt in other regions. To test the performance of the polynomials,
I also estimated regression (11) using a cubic-spline approximation with knots at relative price in-
tervals of 0.05, 0.10, and 0.20 (prior to taking logarithms), while controlling for station effects
using ﬁxed-effects estimation. Cubic-spline approximations are more ﬂexible than polynomials
36and less sensitive to outliers, but they are sensitive to the number and placement of knots. Finally,
I estimated the model semi-parametrically using Yatchew’s (1997) estimator for the partial linear
model with a bandwidth of 0.03 and 0.06.26 Semi-parametric estimators give more detailed local
approximations, but estimates are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. See Hausman and Newey
(1995) for a discussion of these tradeoffs as applied to gasoline demand.
Figures 7(c)–(d) plot the elasticity estimates from the cubic-spline and semi-parametric ap-
proaches. For neither the cubic-spline nor the semi-parametric approaches am I able to reject the
least ﬂexible of the functional forms, although the more ﬂexible semi-parametric approach reveals
additional nonlinearities that the polynomial and cubic-spline approaches obscure.
5.3.4 Preference heterogeneity
My results all point to heterogeneous preferences for ethanol. First, relative prices vary consider-
ably across stations and over time, which would not happen if preferences were literally homoge-
nous, since retailers would be forced to set a single price. At a minimum, fuel-switching behavior
extends over a wide range of relative prices where ethanol is discounted 0%-25% below gasoline.
These results suggest (1) that some consumers are willing to pay a per-mile premium for ethanol,
and (2) that preferences are actually quite diffuse among households that choose ethanol at ob-
served prices. Second, while my 2SLS elasticity estimates are large in magnitude, they are not
26For a general partial-linear model given by:
yt = f(xt)+Ztb+et;
Yatchew’s procedure entails: (1) sorting the data by xt, (2) differencing the data to remove the non-linear component
f(xt) under the assumption that f(xt)  f(xs) for xt  xs, (3) estimating b parametrically on the differenced data, (4)
subtracting the predicted value of this parametric regression from the original dependent variable to yield yt  Z0
t ˆ b, and
ﬁnally (5) regressing yt  Z0
t ˆ b on xt non-parametically using any number of non-parametric regression techniques. I
employ tenth-order differencing using Yatchew’s (1998) optimal differencing weights, which improves efﬁciency to
within 5% of Robinson’s (1988) fully efﬁcient procedure. I control for station effects using station dummy variables.
Several hundred observations share the same relative price as another observation, which means the results may be
sensitive to how sorting ties are broken. I therefore estimate the ﬁrst stage 50 separate times, breaking ties randomly in
each trial, and take the mean coefﬁcient values from these trials as my ﬁrst-stage estimates. In practice, my estimates
varynegligiblyacrosstrials. Ithenestimatethenon-parametricportionofthemodelusinglocalpolynomialregression,
which has attractive properties in the extremes of the data. Polynomials also yield intuitive and convenient estimates
for ﬁrst derivatives. I use a quadratic local polynomial, which is appropriate for estimating ﬁrst derivatives (Fan and
Gijbels 1996), and an Epanechnikov kernel weighting function. I calculate an “optimal” bandwidth of 0.03 using a
rule-of-thumb approximation (Fan and Gijbels 1996, p.111).
37nearly as large as they would be if household preferences for ethanol were more homogeneous, as
in ﬁgure 1(a). Third, my linear 2SLS estimates are for the most part consistent across different sets
of instruments, which is consistent with a roughly constant elasticity function. Fourth and ﬁnally,
when I estimate ﬂexible elasticity functions directly, I also ﬁnd that elasticities are roughly con-
stant. These results are all consistent with a ﬂat elasticity function and heterogeneous preferences
for ethanol, as in ﬁgure 1(b) above.
Unfortunately, because I rarely observe ethanol discounted less than 0% or more than 25% be-
low gasoline, I am unable to estimate the elasticity function or say anything deﬁnitive about pref-
erences in those regions. I can, however, estimate the distribution of preferences over the range of
observed prices. Rough calculations suggest that about 13% of ﬂexible-fuel owners chose ethanol
during my sample period when the price ratio averaged 1.14. Thus, I can impose H(1:14) = 0:13
and use any one of my elasticity estimates to reveal the rest of the distribution (i.e., by integrating
the elasticity function with respect to relative prices), as detailed in the appendix.
One concern is that my estimates, which reﬂect preferences for ethanol in a particular time and
place, may not be appropriate for out-of-sample simulations. I tested whether preferences have
changed over time (e.g., due to advertising campaigns late in the sample period) by estimating
the model separately on data for 1997–2003 and 2004–2006. I also tested whether preferences
vary cross-sectionally (e.g., with the importance of agriculture in the local economy) by estimating
the model separately for stations in the Twin Cities and stations in greater Minnesota. Fixed-
effects polynomial and cubic-spline estimates show no signiﬁcant differences over time or across
geography, however, which suggests that efforts to make the results more nationally representative
would probably not alter my main ﬁndings appreciably.
One ﬁnal concern is that some of the heterogeneity I observe derives not from variation in
preferences per se but from variation in ethanol’s relative convenience. If so, then my estimates
may give inaccurate predictions when I simulate the effects of an ethanol standard, which would
presumably expand ethanol’s availability beyond current levels. In reality, while there are rela-
tively few ethanol stations statewide, if a given town has an ethanol station at all, it is typically
38located near other gasoline stations. Thus, while some consumers may be driving out of their way
for ethanol, most are probably not driving very far. Hence, correcting for variation in ethanol’s
convenience also would not alter my main conclusions appreciably.27
6 Policy simulation
I use my model and estimates to simulate the effects of an ethanol content standard, which man-
dates that denatured ethanol comprise a minimum fraction of the overall gasoline supply. The
simulation model is necessarily stylized and intended to highlight the importance of modeling het-
erogeneous preferences for ethanol. I simulate 15% and 25% standards. The 25% standard is
consistent with the federal RFS of 36 billion gallons annually for 2022, which represents about
25% of current gasoline consumption.28 I assume in my simulations that industry complies with
the standard by increasing the market share of retail ethanol, although blending with regular gaso-
line in other ratios would also be a potential compliance strategy.29 My model and estimates could
also be used to evaluate other government policies to promote retail ethanol.
I assume in my simulations that, for price ratios less than 1.35, preferences follow the cdf im-
plied by my 2SLS ﬁxed-effects estimates. Rather than extrapolate forward out of sample, however,
I impose that the remaining mass of households share the same fuel-switching price ratio of 1.35,
which is the average ratio of gasoline to ethanol mileage and therefore consistent with most con-
27Within a ﬁve-mile radius, 60% of competing stations are within 0.5 miles and half are within 1 mile. At a time
cost of $15 per hour, travel speed of 30 miles per hour, ethanol cost of $1.75 per gallon, fuel economy of 20 miles
per gallon, and refueling rate of 15 gallons, traveling one mile round-trip out of the way for ethanol (the median)
would add only $0.04 to the effective price of ethanol. Adjusting for this extra distance would (given the forgoing
assumptions) shift a price ratio of 1.15 to 1.12.
28Recall that while this standard mandates a minimum quantity of renewable fuel, the EPA rulemaking that imple-
ments the standard sets a minimum percentage of renewable fuel in each compliance period. Gasoline consumption is
not projected to increase much in the coming decades.
29Although industry has thus far been blending ethanol with gasoline to comply, this strategy will soon be limited
by the fact that regular gasoline vehicles cannot run on ethanol blends higher than 10%. Industry recently requested a
waiver from EPA that would allow ethanol blends higher than 10% in regular gasoline; it is unclear whether this waiver
will be approved and whether automakers would similarly modify vehicle warranties. Given that a sizeable fraction of
households are willing to pay a per-mile premium for ethanol, however, it is possible that industry would eventually
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to differentiate between the two fuels and recover costs by charging households with ﬂexible-fuel
vehicles a higher price for ethanol.
39sumers minimizing fuel costs. In effect, I assume that the distribution of preferences has a mass
point at 1.35 and a long left tail consistent with my estimates. For comparison to previous analyses
that assume identical preferences, I also simulate the standards assuming that all households are
massed at 1.35. I close the model by adding a supply side, drawing on previous work by Holland
et al. (2008). I numerically search for retail fuel prices and a shadow value on the ethanol content
constraint such that households maximize utility, suppliers maximize proﬁts, industry complies
with the constraint, and markets clear. See table 5 and the appendix for further details on the
simulation.
Table 5 presents the simulation results. Scenario 1 assumes that households have nearly iden-
tical preferences based on ethanol’s mileage relative to gasoline. This constrains the equilibrium
price ratio under the standard to nearly equal the mileage ratio of 1.35. A 15% ethanol content
standard reduces gasoline consumption by about 12% and reduces carbon dioxide emissions by
about 4%. The policy is costly, however, at $12 billion annually. I calculate total costs based on
changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus, with changes in tax revenue (i.e., fuel taxes net
of the federal ethanol subsidy) entering as lump-sum transfers. These impacts are about twice as
high for the 25% standard.
Scenario 2 assumes that households are heterogeneous as implied by my estimates. After
accounting for the fact that some households prefer ethanol, the surplus cost of a 15% ethanol
content standard falls by 10%. Costs are lower in scenario 2 because households with strong
preferences can be induced to purchase ethanol with less severe distortion of market prices, as
evidenced by the lower equilibrium price ratio of 1.1.30 For the 25% standard, surplus costs are
only 3% lower than in scenario 1. A fairly high price ratio of 1.31 is needed to comply with
the standard, and so price distortion is nearly as high. The fuel supply industry beneﬁts quite
substantially under the policy, although producer surplus in the table does not distinguish between
30In fact, baseline ethanol consumption is actually higher in scenario 2. The expansion of baseline ethanol consump-
tion above current levels occurs because I assume for the simulation that all households own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles,
whereas in reality this fraction is quite small. While conversion costs are low and falling over time, they are not zero,
and so production of these vehicles derives primarily from CAFE incentives. Endogenizing ﬂexible-fuel conversions
by adding conversion costs to the analysis would reduce the difference between scenarios 1 and 2 and increase the cost
of complying with an ethanol content standard.
40Table 5: Simulation results
Scenario 1: Identical households
Ethanol standard
0% 15% 25%
ethanol price ($/gallon) 2.68 2.17 2.52
gasoline price ($/gallon) 2.62 2.90 3.38
gasoline / ethanol price 0.98 1.34 1.34
quantity pure ethanol (billion gallons) 4.95 21.61 35.99
quantity pure gasoline (billion gallons) 136.86 122.44 108.30
emissions (million mtCO2) 1229.08 1185.28 1132.54
change consumer surplus (billion $) 0.00 -7.73 -21.00
change producer surplus (billion $) 0.00 3.07 13.65
change tax revenue (billion $) 0.00 -7.37 -14.59
total cost (billion $) 0.00 -12.03 -21.94
cost per gasoline saved ($/gallon) 0.83 0.77
cost per emissions reduced ($/mtCO2) 274.69 227.24
Scenario 2: Heterogeneous households
Ethanol standard
0% 15% 25%
ethanol price ($/gallon) 3.29 2.51 2.50
gasoline price ($/gallon) 2.56 2.75 3.27
gasoline / ethanol price 0.78 1.10 1.31
quantity pure ethanol (billion gallons) 9.34 20.50 34.02
quantity pure gasoline (billion gallons) 129.38 116.35 101.93
emissions (million mtCO2) 1185.10 1126.07 1066.61
change consumer surplus (billion $) 0.00 -3.11 -14.35
change producer surplus (billion $) 0.00 -1.11 6.96
change tax revenue (billion $) 0.00 -6.62 -13.96
total cost (billion $) 0.00 -10.84 -21.35
cost per gasoline saved ($/gallon) 0.83 0.78
cost per emissions reduced ($/mtCO2) 183.70 180.22
Note: Scenario 1 assumes that fuel-switching price ratios follow a normal cdf with mean 1.35 and standard
deviation 0.01. Scenario 2 assumes that fuel-switching price ratios follow the supremum of (a) a normal
cdf with mean 1.35 and standard deviation 0.01 and (b) the cdf implied by my 2SLS ﬁxed-effects elasticity
estimates with H(1:14) = 0:13; this amounts to adding a long left tail to the distribution in scenario 1.
All simulations assume: that every household owns a ﬂexible-fuel vehicle; a price elasticity for individual
ethanol-equivalent fuel demand of -0.20; price elasticities of 1.25 and 2.5 for pure gasoline and denatured
ethanol supply; 8.8 kilograms of CO2 emissions per gallon of gasoline; and that ethanol’s energy-adjusted,
life-cycle CO2 emissions are 15% lower than gasoline. The aggregate ethanol-equivalent fuel demand
function is calibrated to 2006 gasoline quantities and retail prices. Supply functions are calibrated to 2006
quantities and national-average wholesale spot prices; supply functions also include a constant marginal
cost for distribution, marketing, and taxes net of subsidies. See the appendix for further details.
41producers of ethanol and gasoline. Consumers and taxpayers split the remaining costs 60-40.
Gasoline consumption and greenhouse gas emissions under the 15% and 25% standards fall by
about the same amount as in scenario 1.
The ethanol content standard remains a costly policy, however, even after accounting for re-
vealed preferences. Surplus costs in scenario 2 average about $0.80 per gallon of gasoline saved.
For comparison, a recent study by Harrington, Parry and Walls (2007) assumes $0.12 per gallon
for the external costs of petroleum dependence, though the studies they review estimate a range of
$0.08–$0.50 per gallon.31 Surplus costs in scenario 2 average more than $200 per ton of carbon
dioxide emissions avoided. Again, these costs exceed most estimates for climate damages from
carbon dioxide emissions. A recent meta-analysis suggests that marginal damages are unlikely to
exceed $15 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions (Tol 2005), while even pessimistic recent estimates
put marginal damages at only $85 per ton (Stern 2006).
These estimates are sensitive to assumptions about ethanol’s life-cycle emissions and other
impacts. If land-use changes eat into ethanol’s moderate climate beneﬁts, as recent studies suggest
is likely, the content standard could actually increase emissions. In addition, most life-cycle studies
assume that ethanol plants use natural gas, while some new plants rely on coal, which is much
dirtier. Lastly, ethanol consumes a lot of water, which may grow scarcer with climate change,
while fertilizer and nutrient runoff from corn production are also damaging.
There are several other limitations to these results. First, my estimates reﬂect preferences
of households in Minnesota that own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles and live near ethanol pumps. These
households may have stronger preferences. While price responses are not statistically different
over time or across regions, I am unable to verify that the estimates are representative. Second,
it is difﬁcult to determine precisely the fraction of households that choose ethanol at observed
prices, and I can only speculate about preferences outside my sample. Third, any heterogeneity
that derives from variation in ethanol’s convenience will likely diminish over time as the ethanol
31They include petroleum dependence costs in a comprehensive measure of gasoline-related externalities, which
they estimate at $2.20 per gallon. The majority of these costs depend on miles driven, however, and therefore hit
ethanol even harder due to its poor mileage relative to gasoline.
42market expands.
On the supply side, previous research has not estimated ethanol and gasoline supply elasticities
as convincingly as one would hope, though this is an active area of research. Second, I do not
consider preexisting distortions, such as agricultural price supports, nor do I consider other general
equilibrium effects. Commodity prices were high in the sample period, however, and price ﬂoors
were not binding. Finally, I do not consider new technologies that would facilitate cheap ethanol
production from agricultural waste or other feedstocks. While the RFS actually mandates that a
substantial fraction of the standard be met with such fuels, forcing these technologies prematurely
could increase the cost of the standard. Addressing these various issues would have an ambigu-
ous effect on overall costs, but the key qualitative point remains: accounting for heterogeneous
preferences can (in this case) reduce simulated costs.
7 Conclusion
I develop a model that explicitly links aggregate demand for ethanol in a market to the distribution
of household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute. The model allows me to extract infor-
mation about micro preferences from aggregate data on ethanol quantities and relative fuel prices.
I need not observe gasoline quantities, in contrast to other methodologies that match predicted
and observed market shares. I estimate the model using panel IV methods and data from a large
number of retail fueling stations. My theoretical model implies that elasticities might vary dramat-
ically with relative prices. Thus, I attempt to determine which part(s) of the demand function are
weighted most heavily in my IV estimates using a heuristic approach, and I test whether different
instruments (operating in different parts of the demand function) give different results. Taking
a more direct approach, I also estimate elasticities that vary ﬂexibly with relative fuel prices us-
ing semi-parametric estimation and other ﬂexible methods. Future research could apply this model
and these methodologies to estimate preferences for other goods with perfect substitutes. Imposing
constant elasticities in such contexts may give misleading results.
43I ﬁnd that demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute is sensitive to relative fuel prices, with
elasticities of about 2.5–3.5. Price responses are considerably smaller and less variable, however,
than they would be if preferences were identical. Fuel-switching behavior extends over a wide
range of relative prices where ethanol is discounted 0%–25%, and there is no single price at which
a large mass of consumers suddenly switches to ethanol. The results imply that some households
are willing to pay a premium for ethanol and that preferences among these households are quite
heterogeneous.
These results have important implications for policy. Accounting for households that prefer
ethanol can cut the cost of an ethanol content standard substantially. While the typical house-
hold may require a large subsidy, households with stronger preferences choose ethanol with min-
imal price distortion, reducing costs in some cases. Similar intuition likely applies for policies
to promote other “green” substitutes, such as renewable electricity, energy-efﬁcient lighting and
appliances, hybrid-electric vehicles, or organic foods. Researchers should take care to distinguish
between average and marginal households when assessing the impacts of policy; assuming identi-
cal preferences for all households can yield misleading results and (in this case) overstate costs.
The ethanol content standard nevertheless remains a costly policy. Costs per gallon of gasoline
saved or ton of carbon emissions avoided exceed most conventional estimates of external dam-
ages, even after revising the analysis in ethanol’s favor. Moreover, to the extent that preferences
for ethanol reﬂect pure altruism toward farmers, the environment, or national security, then the
behavior I interpret as reducing costs is in fact only shifting costs, at least in part. Finally, some of
the altruism may actually be misplaced. If land-use changes associated with growing feedstocks
negate ethanol’s climate beneﬁts, or if ethanol’s other side effects are not managed carefully, then
the policy could actually damage the environment. Policies that tax or regulate carbon dioxide
emissions directly tend to mitigate such side-effects.
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Appendix: Not for Publication
Soren T. Anderson
A Aggregate demand and household welfare







Aggregate demand for gasoline reﬂects households that own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles but choose
gasoline, as well as households that do not own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles. Gasoline demand for house-














which is just the total number of households that do not own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles multiplied
by their average gasoline consumption. Here, as above, I rely on the assumption that ﬂexible-
fuel vehicles and v() are distributed independently of r (and of each other). Adding these two












1Maximized utility for an individual household that chooses ethanol is
v(q(pe))+y  peq(pe); (16)





which holds whenever r > pg=pe. Because I assume that household utility is linearly separable
in the composite good, and because I assume an interior solution with respect to consumption of
























where I have left the averaging over v() and q() implicit to simplify the notation. The top term
is average welfare for households that own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles weighted by the fraction of these
households, and the bottom term is average welfare for households that do not own ﬂexible-
fuel vehicles weighted by the fraction of such households. Average welfare for households that
own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles reﬂects both households that choose ethanol as well as households that
choose gasoline. Multiplying by the total number of households N gives aggregate welfare.
B Retail supply behavior
How will a retailer facing the demand functions developed above choose to set prices, and how
will these prices respond to shifting costs? For an ethanol retailer located close to other retailers,
2competition will drive the retail price of ethanol down to marginal costs:
pe = ce; (19)






where r = pg=pe is the price ratio the retailer chooses, and where I assume for simplicity that
the retail price of gasoline pg is ﬁxed exogenously by conditions in the retail gasoline market.32




When ethanol’s cost relative to the price of gasoline increases, relative retail prices increase ac-
cordingly.
Marginal-cost pricing is not a particularly good model for understanding retail ethanol pricing
behavior. Current retail ethanol markets reﬂect a peculiar mix of monopoly power and competition.
Becauserelativelyfewstationsofferretailethanol, customerbasesoverlaponlymarginally, ifatall,
allowing ethanol retailers to operate largely as local monopolists. At the same time, these retailers
compete directly with nearby gasoline stations in the broader fuels market, because ﬂexible-fuel
vehicle owners are able to switch seamlessly between ethanol and gasoline.
Consider ﬁrst a monopolist ethanol retailer that only offers ethanol. The retailer chooses the
price of ethanol to maximize proﬁts:
P(pe;pg) = Qe(pe;pg)pe ceQe(pe;pg); (22)
32This assumption is consistent with the current fuel market, where relatively few stations offer ethanol and ethanol
sales volumes are low relative to gasoline. This assumption would not be valid for a signiﬁcantly expanded retail
ethanol market.
3where P is retailer proﬁt, which is a function of the retail prices of ethanol pe and regular gasoline
pg, Qe is the quantity of ethanol demanded as a function of retail prices, and ce is the constant
marginal cost of offering ethanol. I assume for simplicity that the retail price of gasoline pg is
ﬁxed exogenously by conditions in the retail gasoline market.
The ﬁrst-order condition of this maximization problem is given by:
Qe+Q0
epe ceQ0
e  0; (23)
where all derivatives are with respect to the retail price of ethanol and I have suppressed the argu-
ments of functions for clarity. Collecting terms that contain Q0
e, moving Qe to the right-hand side,
and then dividing by pe and Q0
















where µe  (pe ce)=pe is the percent retail markup of ethanol and xe is the own-price elasticity
of aggregate ethanol demand. This is the standard monopoly result where the retailer equates the
percent retail markup to the negative reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand.
Now consider a monopolist ethanol retailer that also sells gasoline. Adding proﬁts from gaso-
















g is the change in gasoline sales volume given a marginal increase in the price of ethanol,
µg (pg cg)=pg is the percent retail markup of gasoline, and all other terms are as above. I again
assume that retail gasoline prices are ﬁxed by market competition. When a station’s ethanol price
has no effect on its gasoline sales, so that Q0
g = 0, the ﬁrst-order condition reduces to the simple
4case above. When Q0
g > 0, however, the optimal price of ethanol is higher, because increasing the
price of ethanol drives some consumers to gasoline at the same station. This incentive increases
with Q0
g. The incentive to increase ethanol prices and drive consumers to gasoline also increases
with gasoline markups µg.
In areas where overall competition is ﬁerce, retailers that increase the price of ethanol are
unlikely to capture many customers switching to gasoline, since these customers have many com-
peting gasoline stations from which to choose. That is, Q0
g will be relatively small in magnitude,
and pricing behavior will tend toward the simple case above. In areas where competition is weak,
however, so that Q0
g is large in magnitude, the incentive to increase the price of ethanol and could
be quite strong.
I now return to the case of a monopolist ethanol retailer that only sells ethanol. Restating this
retailer’s ﬁrst-order condition in terms of the price ratio r by making the substitutions pe = pg=r








where r is the price ratio the retailer chooses. Assuming that the price elasticity of individual
ethanol-equivalent fuel demand xf is constant, the implicit function theorem gives the following

















Recall that xf is constant by assumption and that xg and x0
g only depend on relative prices.
Expression (27) implies that changes in relative costs will have their largest impact on relative
retail prices when the fuel-switching elasticity is roughly constant near the optimum, so that x0
g is
close to zero. In contrast, when the elasticity is highly variable near the optimum, which indicates
a large concentration of households near that same fuel-switching price ratio, x0
g will be large in
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(b) r  N(1:25;0:30)
Figure 8: Proﬁt-maximizing retail price ratio
Note: Figure illustrates proﬁt-maximizing price ratios for a monopolist ethanol retailer. Proﬁt-maximizing
price ratios are given by intersection of markups and the negative reciprocal of the own-price elasticity,
as in equation (25). More proﬁtable and less proﬁtable cases assume that marginal ethanol costs are 60%
and 80% the retail price of gasoline. Elasticity functions assume a constant ethanol-equivalent fuel price
elasticity of -0.25.
case where households have identical preferences for ethanol, x0
g will be inﬁnitely large in mag-
nitude and relative prices will be invariant to underlying costs. Retailers will be reluctant to raise
ethanol prices when costs increase, lest they drive all consumers to gasoline. At the same time,
retailers will have no incentive to reduce prices when costs fall, because lowering prices will not
stimulate any additional demand.
Figure 8 illustrates this ﬁrst-order condition and comparative static for two hypothetical fuel-
switching elasticity functions, where I have set the elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel
demand to a constant -0.20. The ﬁgures illustrate that when household preferences are nearly
homogeneous, so that price elasticities are highly variable, as in ﬁgure 8(a), the proﬁt-maximizing
price ratio is insensitive to changes in relative costs. When household preferences are more diffuse,
however, so that price elasticities are less variable, as in ﬁgure 8(b), shifts in relative costs lead to

















































Figure 9: Retail fuel prices
Note: Retail ethanol price is the monthly volume-weighted average retail price of
ethanol at reporting stations in Minnesota. Retail gasoline price is the monthly
county-average retail price of regular gasoline, weighted by retail ethanol sales
volumes at these same stations. Prices are in 2006 dollars.
C Aggregate price trends
Figure9plotsaverageretailethanolandregulargasolinepricesfromOctober1997throughNovem-
ber 2006. Average ethanol prices track regular gasoline prices closely, albeit at a noticeable dis-
count for most of the period.
Figure 10 plots average wholesale prices for the same time period. Wholesale spot prices for
denatured ethanol do not always track wholesale gasoline prices closely. This is perhaps not sur-
prising, given that demand for denatured ethanol derives largely from its role as a complement to
gasoline production and less from its role as a gasoline substitute. Opportunities for direct substi-
tution do exist, however, and large price differences can create strong incentives for substitution,
which is one reason that wholesale ethanol prices track wholesale gasoline prices broadly over

















































Figure 10: Wholesale fuel prices
Note: Wholesale ethanol price is a weighted average of the spot price for denatured
ethanol in Minneapolis and Fargo, less the federal ethanol blending tax credit.
Wholesale gasoline price is the Minnesota volume-weighted average rack price.
Prices are in 2006 dollars.
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita knocked out Gulf Coast petroleum reﬁneries and distribution
pipelines. Ethanol prices were low relative to gasoline in the ﬁrst half of 2005 due to a glut of
ethanol. Ethanol prices then spiked to equal gasoline prices as ethanol substituted for gasoline
after the hurricanes. Ethanol’s margin relative to gasoline eventually returned to pre-hurricane lev-
els as reﬁneries and pipelines came back on line and as imports of reﬁned gasoline arrived from
abroad.
A second reason that wholesale prices track broadly is that ethanol and a petroleum-based
chemical fuel additive called methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) are close substitutes in some
U.S. regions during much of this time period, creating an avenue for petroleum prices to correlate
indirectly with ethanol prices. The importance of this substitution is most evident in the ﬁrst half of
2006, when fuel suppliers quit using MTBE due to concerns about potential groundwater contam-
ination. Prices surged as ethanol ﬁlled the gap left by this key substitute. Ethanol prices fell in the
8summer months as ethanol reﬁners scaled up production and as fuel distributors resolved logistical
difﬁculties in transporting ethanol from reﬁneries in the Midwest, where ethanol is produced, to
markets on the coasts, where MTBE had previously held a large market share.
Figure 5(a) above demonstrates that large ﬂuctuations in relative wholesale prices correlate
with comparatively small changes in retail prices. Note that the scale for the wholesale price ratio
in ﬁgure 5(a) above is ﬁve times as large as the scale for the retail price ratio. What explains
this behavior? The natural assumption is that ethanol retailers are pricing ethanol based primarily
on what ﬂexible-fuel vehicle owners are willing to pay, relative to gasoline, as opposed to what
the fuel costs. As I show above in appendix section B, when the elasticity is highly variable and
retailers are monopolists, the relative price of ethanol will be insensitive to changes in ethanol’s
costs relative to gasoline. The pricing behavior in ﬁgure 5(a) is therefore consistent with a highly
variable elasticity function.
There are alternative explanations. Above, I described rule-of-thumb pricing strategies, supply
relationships that mechanically tie retail ethanol prices to gasoline, and pricing formulae for long-
term ethanol contracts, which could all lead retail prices to be less variable than observed spot
prices. In addition, station owners may have an incentive to reduce price volatility by maintaining
retail ethanol prices that are more consistent with the long-run relationship between gasoline prices
and ethanol costs. Short-term proﬁts may suffer, but this strategy helps maintain a consistent
customer base. Indeed, several industry representatives I spoke with indicated that some retailers
were actually pricing ethanol below costs in late 2005 and early 2006. Ethanol costs were high
relative to gasoline, due to the discontinuation of MTBE, but some retailers were willing to incur
temporary losses to maintain favorable relationships with their customers.
D Evidence of cross-sectional variation in pricing behavior
As I describe in the main text, about one-third of ethanol retailers in Minnesota purchase ethanol
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Figure 11: Relative wholesale prices and relative retail fuel prices
Note: Top ﬁgure shows relative retail prices for stations in counties within 50 miles of Benson and for
other rural counties. Bottom ﬁgure shows relative retail prices for stations in Twin Cities counties and for
stations in rural counties.
10Throughout the entire sample period, this reﬁnery supplied retail ethanol at a ﬁxed nominal dis-
count to the spot price of regular gasoline. The ethanol retailers, in turn, agreed to price retail
ethanol at the same discount below regular gasoline at their stations. When retail ethanol prices are
tied directly to the price of gasoline, relative prices will be less responsive to changes in ethanol’s
relative cost. This is apparent in ﬁgure 11(a), which plots relative retail prices for stations located
in counties within 50 miles of the Benson reﬁnery, which are most likely to have contracts with
this reﬁnery, and for stations located in other counties outside the Twin Cities. In 2000-2001,
when wholesale ethanol costs were high relative to gasoline, stations near Benson priced ethanol
at a larger percent discount. This happened again in late 2003-2004 and at times in late 2005-2006.
Figure 11(b) plots relative retail prices for stations located inside and outside the Twin Cities,
where the density of retail ethanol stations is higher. Stations in the Twin Cities appear to be more
sensitive to changes in relative costs. When wholesale ethanol costs are low relative to gasoline,
stations in the Twin Cities discount ethanol more heavily than in rural areas. When wholesale
ethanol costs are high relative to gasoline, retailers in the Twin Cities do not discount ethanol as
generously. This pricing behavior is consistent with retailers in the Twin Cities facing greater
competition and therefore being more sensitive to changes in relative costs.
E Using elasticity estimates to reveal preferences
This section shows how to retrieve the distribution of household preferences from aggregate price













11Assume that an estimate of the elasticity function is available for price ratios ranging from rL to





















Given H(rL) and an econometric estimate of xg(x) over the interval [rL;rH], equation (31) yields
an estimate for the cdf of household preferences on the interval.
A boundary condition is required to solve for H(rL). Suppose one knows that the fraction of












and equation (31) yields the distribution of preferences on the interval [rL;rH].
Unfortunately, it is not possible to reveal the full distribution of household preferences for
ethanol, unless one has an estimate for the elasticity function over the entire range of possible
fuel-switching price ratios.
Because I rarely observe ethanol discounted less than 0% or more than 25% below gasoline, I
am unable to estimate the elasticity function or say anything deﬁnitive about preferences in those
regions. I can, however, estimate the distribution of preferences over the range of observed prices.
Rough calculations suggest that 5% of ﬂexible-fuel owners in a county choose ethanol on
average during the study period, when the price ratio averaged 1.14.33 This ﬁgure likely understate
33There are about 3250 ﬂexible-fuel vehicles per county on average. Assuming a ﬂexible-fuel vehicle drives 1000
miles per month and achieves 14 miles per gallon on ethanol (the sales-weighted average based on EPA mileage
estimates), this translates to 1000=143250  230;000 potential gallons per county. Actual sales average about 3350
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Figure 12: Estimated and simulation cdfs for fuel-switching price ratios
Note: Figure on the left shows cdfs for fuel-switching price ratios based on several alternative estimators
of the fuel-switching elasticity function. Each cdf assumes that H(1:14) = 0:13. See text for further
details. The ﬁgure on the right shows the precise cdf used in the simulations, which is based on the 2SLS
ﬁxed-effects constant-elasticity estimates for price ratios less than 1.35. See text for details.
the fraction of ﬂexible-fuel owners that would choose ethanol if given the option, however, since
not all households currently have access to the fuel, given its limited availability. Assuming, based
on somewhat speculative calculations, that only 40% of the households in a county currently have
access on average, then ethanol’s implied market share is actually 2.5 times as high. Thus, I can
impose H(1:14) = 0:13 and use any one my estimated elasticity functions to back out the rest of
the cdf.34 Figure 12(a) does this using the 2SLS constant-elasticity estimates in table 2 and the
OLS variable-elasticity estimates from ﬁgure 7 above.
Figure 12(b) plots the precise cdf I use in my simulations below. This cdf is based on my 2SLS
ﬁxed-effects estimation of the constant-elasticity model. Following the calculations above, the cdf
assumes that H(1:14) = 0:13. I then use my elasticity estimates to reveal the cdf for price ratios
less than 1.35. Rather than extrapolate forward out of sample, however, I impose that the remaining
roughly 12;400=230;000  5% of ﬂexible-fuel owners choose ethanol.
34The average county in my sample is about 750 square miles. If stations drew households from within a ﬁve-mile
radius, which is about 80 square miles, then 3.7 non-overlapping stations per county would cover about 3:780  300
square miles. If households were evenly distributed, then about 300=750 = 40%, or roughly half of consumers would
have access. The fraction with access would be higher if households were more concentrated near stations and lower
if the market radius was smaller than ﬁve miles.
13mass of households share nearly the same fuel-switching price ratio of 1.35, which is the average
ratio of gasoline to ethanol mileage for ﬂexible-fuel vehicles and therefore consistent with most
consumers minimizing fuel costs. While a large mass of households at 1.35 would imply retailers
could have dramatically increased revenues by lowering the relative price of ethanol during the
study period, this rarely would have been proﬁtable given wholesale ethanol costs. Note that a
price ratio of 1.35 is roughly equivalent to a 25% ethanol discount.
F Simulation details
F.1 Minimum ethanol content standard





where Qe and Qg are the aggregate retail quantities of ethanol and gasoline, pe is the percent
denatured ethanol content of retail ethanol, pg is the percent denatured ethanol content of retail
gasoline, and s is the minimum fraction of denatured ethanol in the fuel supply as mandated by the
ethanol content standard. I assume that pe  s  pg, where the leftmost inequality guarantees that
the ethanol content standard is technically achievable, and the rightmost inequality implies that the
standard is not met trivially for any combination of fuels. Rearranging the inequality demonstrates







An ethanol content standard is therefore identical to any fuel performance standard that im-
plicitly mandates a minimum market share requirement for ethanol, including a low-carbon fuel
standard met through increased ethanol production.
14F.2 Model of the fuels market
Following Holland et al. (2008) I assume that a competitive fuel supply industry maximizes proﬁts
given by:
peQe+ pgQg C(Qe;Qg)+l[peQe+pgQg s(Qe+Qg)]; (35)
where pe and pg are the retail prices of ethanol and regular gasoline, Qe and Qg are the aggregate
retail quantities of ethanol and regular gasoline,C(;) is the fuel industry’s cost function, which is
increasing in both arguments and convex, l is the shadow value of the ethanol content constraint,
and pe and pg are as above. Note that the total quantity of denatured ethanol required to produce
the given retail quantities is peQe+pgQg, while the total quantity of pure gasoline is (1 pe)Qe+
(1 pg)Qg. The cost function reﬂects denatured ethanol and gasoline reﬁning and distribution
costs, as well as the costs of blending, distribution, and retail marketing. The cost function also
reﬂects retail fuel taxes, as well as subsidies for denatured ethanol blending.
The ﬁrst-order conditions from the fuel supplier proﬁt maximization problem and the house-










l[peQe+pgQg s(Qe+Qg)] = 0; (38)
where l  0 and where I have assumed that v() is identical for all households. The ﬁrst condition
holds for all consumers with r  pg=pe who choose ethanol and the second condition holds for
all consumers with r > pg=pe who choose gasoline. These equilibrium conditions state that each
household’s marginal willingness to pay for fuel equals the fuel supply industry’s marginal cost.
The third condition is that either the ethanol content constraint is binding or that the shadow value
of the constraint is zero.
15The ethanol content standard gives an implicit subsidy of l[pe s] for the production of retail
ethanol, because the denatured ethanol content of retail ethanol exceeds the standard. Conversely,
the standard imposes an implicit tax of l[s pg] on the production of retail gasoline, because the
denatured ethanol content of gasoline is less than the standard. The ultimate effect of the standard
on equilibrium fuel quantities depends on the stringency of the standard, the fuel industry’s cost
function, the household’s ethanol-equivalent fuel demand function, and the distribution of fuel-
switching price ratios.
Holland et al. (2008) use a similar model to evaluate a low-carbon fuel standard met through
increased ethanol production. They show that such a standard can never deliver efﬁcient reduc-
tions in carbon dioxide emissions, because the standard implicitly subsidizes ethanol while taxing
gasoline. Any ﬁrst-best policy must tax all fuels that contain carbon, including ethanol, based on
marginal external damages. They also show that a low-carbon fuel standard might actually increase
energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions, because the fuel supply industry could meet
the standard simply by increasing ethanol production. This is similar to the well-known result that
a pollution performance standard may create incentives to expand output if the rate of pollution
increases less than proportionally with production. These results apply equally to my analysis of
an ethanol content standard.
F.3 Calibrating demand
I assume that the fuel consumption component of individual utility is of the form:





so that the household’s maximization problem above yields the following expression for individual
ethanol-equivalent fuel demand:
q(p) = kp e; (40)
16where k is a constant, p is the ethanol-equivalent price, and  e is the constant price elasticity
of ethanol-equivalent fuel demand. The assumption that individual demand has a constant price
elasticity is consistent with my econometric model, which imposes a constant price elasticity of




From here, it is straightforward to calculate aggregate quantities of retail ethanol and gasoline
demand, as well as aggregate household welfare, based on the general expressions available in
appendix section A. Given the functional form assumption above, these expressions depend on
the price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand  e, the scale of fuel demand Nk,
the fraction of households that own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles f, and the distribution of fuel-switching
price ratios H(r).
I calibrate  e =  0:2 based previous estimates of this parameter in the literature; this is also
consistent with my main econometric estimates for fuel-switching responses, which impose this
same elasticity. I then calibrate Nk based on aggregate gasoline demand and average retail gasoline
prices in 2006 under the assumption that f = 0. This is consistent with current market conditions
where few households own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles and those that do have virtually no access to
ethanol. I then reset f = 1 for the simulations. Simulations therefore reﬂect market conditions in a
hypotheticalworldwherethescaleofethanol-equivalentfueldemandisequivalenttocurrentlevels
but where all households own ﬂexible-fuel vehicles. I calibrate H(r) based on my econometric
estimates, as described above.
F.4 Calibrating supply












where: pe and pg are the denatured ethanol content ratios of retail ethanol and gasoline; Be 
peQe+pgQg andBg (1 pe)Qe+(1 pg)Qg arethequantitiesofpureethanolandgasolineblend
stocks required to produce the retail quantities Qe and Qg; the functions KeBe
he and KgBg
hg are
marginal costs of denatured ethanol and gasoline production, reﬂecting all costs through delivery
to fuel terminals, with he, hg, Ke, and Kg parameters to be calibrated; ye and yg are the constant
marginal costs of distributing fuels to retail outlets and retail marketing, to be calibrated; te and tg
are retail fuel taxes remitted by fuel retailers to state and federal governments; and q is the federal
blending subsidy for denatured ethanol.
I assume that pe = 0:85, because retail ethanol contains 85% denatured ethanol. I calibrate
pg = 0:035, which is the fraction of denatured ethanol in gasoline in 2006. I assume 8.8 kilograms
of CO2 emissions per gallon of gasoline and that replacing gasoline with ethanol reduces CO2
emissions by 15% on an energy-adjusted basis. I assume that the constant price elasticity of dena-
tured ethanol supply is 1=he = 2:5 and that the price elasticity of gasoline supply is 1=hg = 1:25,
which are the midpoints of the ranges considered by Holland et al. (2008) based on their reading
of the previous literature. I then calibrate Ke and Kg based on 2006 production quantities and
wholesale spot prices for denatured ethanol and unblended gasoline. I calibrate distribution and
marketing costs ye = yg = $0:16 as the differential between average wholesale prices for retail
gasoline and average pre-tax retail prices. I calibrate te = tg = $0:50 as the average differential
between pre-tax and tax-inclusive retail prices. Finally, I calibrate q = $0:51, which is the current
federal subsidy for denatured ethanol blending in 2006.
F.5 Numerical solution algorithm
The numerical solution algorithm is as follows:
(1) Choose an initial fuel price vector p0 = [p0
e;p0
g].
18(2) Set initial shadow value of ethanol content constraint to zero: l = 0.
(3) Compute quantities supplied based on initial price vector and ﬁrst-order conditions from in-
dustry proﬁt maximization problem. If fuel supply industry is not in compliance, increase l,
return to step (2), and iterate until industry is exactly in compliance with the ethanol content
standard, yielding retail quantities supplied S0 = [S0
e;S0
g]
(4) Compute retail quantities demanded based on initial price vector and ﬁrst-order conditions
from household maximization problem, yielding retail quantities demanded D0 = [D0
e;D0
g].






then stop. Otherwise, update the price vector according to p1 = p0+k[D0 S0], where k is a
positive constant. This moves the price vector in a direction that reduces excess demand. In
practice I decrease k as the number of iterations increases in order to hone in on the market-
clearing price vector. Return to step (1), and iterate.
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